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The New Insider Trading
Karen E. Woody*
ABSTRACT
Pursuant to the SEC’s Rule 10b-5, in order to obtain a conviction for
insider trading based upon a tipper-tippee theory, the government must prove
that the tipper received a personal benefit for the tip, and that the tippee knew
about that benefit. The last five years of blockbuster insider trading cases
have focused on this seemingly nebulous personal benefit test, and the
Supreme Court has been unable to clear the muddy waters. As a result, the
parameters of insider trading remain hard to pin down and often shift
depending on the facts of the most recent case. Two terms ago, the Supreme
Court, in an unsurprising unanimous decision in Salman v. United States,
reaffirmed the holding of Dirks, from which the personal benefit test arose.
The Court in Salman, however, failed to elucidate the more problematic
areas of insider trading, including the application of the personal benefit test
if the tippee is not a trading relative or friend. Legal practitioners,
legislators, and academics have offered up various solutions for the problem
of having an amorphous law against insider trading, yet none have
succeeded.
This Article suggests that the hubbub over defining the personal benefit
element of insider trading—sure to reach a fever pitch the next time a cert
petition on the issue is granted—may be misguided. This is because there may
be a simpler way to bring an insider trading case. Since Sarbanes-Oxley,
there has been a sleepy provision of the criminal code that could present an
end-around to the morass of insider trading precedents under Rule 10b-5.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1348, the government can bring an insider trading case
under the more general umbrella of securities fraud, which has scant
jurisprudential precedent. In other words, the heavily litigated personal
benefit test found in Dirks may not apply to a charge of insider trading under
§ 1348. The elements required to prove a charge under § 1348 are similar to
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other fraud-based offenses such as mail and wire fraud, health care fraud,
and bank fraud. Whether § 1348 was intended to apply to insider trading in
particular is an open question, and a broader question is whether the
jurisprudential interpretation for the elements of the crime of insider trading
as defined under Rule 10b-5 should be imported into the judicial
interpretation of § 1348. In other words, if the conduct that constitutes
criminal insider trading under Rule 10b-5 exists only if the elements of the
Dirks test are met, then a § 1348 charge for criminal insider trading may
create an entirely new scheme and definition of the crime. This Article
analyzes the potential of this dual paradigm and argues that, given the
uncertainty and shifting parameters of insider trading prohibitions,
application of § 1348 to insider trading should be afforded the rule of lenity.
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INTRODUCTION
Insider trading is not going away. The legal headaches surrounding
prevention, regulation, and prosecution of insider trading seem to have
increased rather than decreased in recent years. The parameters of insider
trading, as charged under Rule 10b-5, are thorny for myriad reasons. First,
since the Powell decisions of the 1980s,1 insider trading is not per se illegal.2
The Powell court rejected the idea that all trading on inside information is
prohibited.3 Thus, the comparisons to other crimes, and the attendant
regulatory “fixes” that are available to assist in curbing other types of
prohibited activity, are likely overbroad when applied to insider trading. 4

1.
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 652 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 225
(1980); see infra Part I.B.
2.
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233–37. See generally Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law Is an
Excuse—But Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REV. 127, 129 (1997) (distinguishing between a
malum prohibitum crime, which is wrong only because it is prohibited by law, and a malum in se
crime, which is a moral wrong, independent of law). Insider trading is a malum prohibitum crime
in certain circumstances and therefore more open to interpretation by the judiciary. This fact
creates the legislative and judicial morass in which insider trading doctrine exists because there
are numerous carve-outs based on relationship status and fiduciary duty. See also infra Part IV
and accompanying notes.
3.
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232–33.
4.
See, e.g., Miriam Baer, Insider Trading’s Legality Problem, 127 YALE L.J.F. 129, 129–
30 (2017), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/Baer_1hb7mucv.pdf [https://perma.cc/WE6JNNWF] (setting up a hypothetical analogizing insider trading to cocaine distribution). While a
helpful example in relation to explaining tipper-tippee theory and conspiracy, the fact that cocaine
distribution is always illegal makes the analogy lack full application to insider trading.
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Second, when insider trading is prohibited, the crime itself is hard to
define. Prosecutors apply criminal fraud elements to an activity that is defined
by tort law concepts of breaches of duty.5 A majority of scholars focus on the
property law concepts at play, arguing that the prohibition on insider trading
can be understood as a means of protecting the firm’s rights to information
as a property right.6 Under this lens, insider trading is theft, or
embezzlement.7 This combination of criminal, tort, and property theories
highlights the question of who or what is the actual victim of insider trading.
Is the victim the market at large?8 The company whose information has been
misappropriated or sold?9 Shareholders?10 Or someone else entirely?
5.
Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94
IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1320 (2009) (acknowledging the gap in insider trading doctrine after United
States v. O’Hagan wherein the crime of insider trading is defined as use of material non-public
information regardless of a breach of fiduciary duty); see also John P. Anderson, Greed, Envy,
and the Criminalization of Insider Trading, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 1, 5 (2014) (analyzing the purpose
of applying criminal law to inside trading); Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE
L.J. 511, 519–20 (2011) (dissecting the elements of fraud and the unique concept of securities
fraud as demanding both a private remedy and public sanction while also diluting the requisite
intent).
6.
See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND POLICY
67 (1991) (noting that the only “conceivable justification for banning insider trading is that such
trading involves the theft of valuable corporate property”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider
Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud,
52 SMU L. REV. 1589, 1592 (1999) (noting that “insider trading ought to be regarded as a property
rights problem rather than a securities fraud issue”); Zachary J. Gubler, Insider Trading as Fraud,
98 N.C. L. REV. 533, 560–61 (2020) (promoting the misappropriation theory of insider trading).
But see Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading on Confidential Information—A Breach in Search
of Duty, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 83, 113 (1998) (arguing that Congress was concerned with fairness
and the protection of investors when it passed the Exchange Act (which houses § 10(b)) and not
the protection of property rights in information).
7.
See, e.g., SEC v. Payton, 97 F. Supp. 3d 558, 559 (S.D.N.Y 2015) (describing insider
trading as a “form of cheating, of using purloined or embezzled information to gain an unfair
trading advantage”); Donna M. Nagy, Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of Insider
Trading: A Post-O’Hagan Suggestion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1223, 1265–67 (1998); A.C. Pritchard,
United States v. O’Hagan: Agency Law and Justice Powell’s Legacy for the Law of Insider
Trading, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 13, 28 (1998).
8.
See Kenneth R. Davis, Insider Trading Flaw: Toward a Fraud-on-the-Market Theory
and Beyond, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 51, 73–74 (2016). But see Pete Brush, Rakoff Tells Gov’t to Dump
‘Level
Playing
Field’
Language,
LAW360
(Apr.
16,
2019),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1150320/rakoff-tells-gov-t-to-dump-level-playing-fieldlanguage [https://perma.cc/BH4C-6TLD] (quoting Judge Rakoff as telling prosecutors to abandon
a theory of ultimate fairness in the stock market).
9.
See Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 1607; Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The
Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 858 (1983).
10. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 719–20 (1986) (analyzing the costs of private litigation, including in cases
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Defining who the victim is inherently defines what the criminal or prohibited
act is. Yet because there is no explicit statutory prohibition on insider trading,
the doctrine is entirely based on common law, with wide-ranging
discrepancies regarding how the crime is defined. 11
Third, in tipper-tippee cases, whether or not the crime of insider trading
has occurred is dependent upon the relational distance between the tipper and
tippee. In other words, a tipper who is related to, or a close friend of, the
tippee has committed insider trading, whereas a tip to a stranger does not
meet the elements of the crime, pursuant to the 1983 case of Dirks v. SEC.12
As a result, each new case that presents different relational distances between
tipper and tippee creates essentially an issue of first impression to the court,
and the court must prescribe a new definition of personal benefit with each
opinion. One only needs to look at the Salman case from OT 2016 to
recognize that a number of unanswered questions remain regarding the limits
of the personal benefit test.13
Because of these issues—and potentially others—practitioners,
prosecutors, legislators, and legal academics have wrestled with how best to
solve the morass of insider trading law.14 On one hand, some suggest a statute
explicitly banning insider trading would provide the desired solution.
Professor Miriam Baer argues for such a legislative fix to create clarity of
definition and suggests tiers of criminality to apply to insider trading
violations.15 Professor Jill Fisch, on the other hand, has argued the judicial
development of insider trading doctrine is advantageous because of the

alleging insider trading among corporate executives); Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky,
The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 714 (2006) (arguing that only
information traders are benefited by securities regulation).
11. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Identifying the Duty Prohibiting Outsider Trading on Material
Nonpublic Information, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 881, 889 (2010) (stating that regulating insider trading
“through an antifraud rule is like trying to fit a square peg into a round hole”).
12. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663–64 (1983); see also United States v. Newman, 773
F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that the Dirks standard required “proof of a meaningfully
close personal relationship that generates an exchange . . . [of] at least a potential gain of a
pecuniary or similarly valuable nature”).
13. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 424 (2016).
14. See, e.g., The Insider Trading Prohibition Act, H.R. 2534, 116th Cong. (2019)
(superseding § 10(b) and forbidding trading in material non-public information if individual trader
is aware of or recklessly disregarded that the information was wrongfully obtained or
communicated); see also Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act of 2015, S. 702, 114th Cong. (2015);
Rachel Graf, Bharara Group To Explore Changing Insider Trading Law, LAW360 (Oct. 11,
2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1090917/bharara-group-to-explore-changing-insidertrading-law [https://perma.cc/3TBY-5SGE].
15. Baer, supra note 4, at 134.
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difficulty in pinning down exactly what insider trading is.16 Fisch asserts that
judicial lawmaking in this area is optimal because federal judges are
ostensibly more insulated from political pressure than are SEC employees or
congressional representatives.17
A recent case decided by the Second Circuit provided some answers to the
debates surrounding insider trading. United States v. Blaszczak is an insider
trading case wherein the defendant was acquitted of insider trading under the
traditional Rule 10b-5 charge but was found guilty under a relatively newer
statutory prohibition, 18 U.S.C § 1348.18 That is, the jury held that the
government could not prove the elements of insider trading under Rule 10b5, including the personal benefit test, but the jury nonetheless found
defendants guilty of general securities fraud under § 1348. The Blaszczak
case presents a potential “new”19 fix to insider trading by way of prosecuting
under § 1348, yet that statute proves to be as nebulous as Rule 10b-5. Neither
Rule 10b-5 nor § 1348 mentions the term “insider trading.” In other words,
18 U.S.C. § 1348 could provide a statutory end-around the Rule 10b-5 morass
but leaves available the same amount of judicial discretion in its
interpretation.
The Blaszczak decision tees up at least two interesting theoretical
questions: first, whether it can be argued that § 1348 is merely the same
charge as Rule 10b-5, creating an issue of “dual-charging,” or multiplicity of
charges.20 This question was not addressed by the Blaszczak court and seems
to be dismissed by many prosecutors as frivolous given that they argue there
16. Jill E. Fisch, Constructive Ambiguity and Judicial Development of Insider Trading, 71
SMU L. REV. 749, 752 (2018); see also Linda S. Eads, From Capone to Boesky: Tax Evasion,
Insider Trading, and Problems of Proof, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1421, 1456 (1991).
17. Fisch, supra note 16, at 758.
18. United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19, 26 (2d Cir. 2019).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1348 is hardly a “new” statutory fix. It was enacted as part of SarbanesOxley, was modeled after the mail and wire fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and § 1343, and
mirrors much of the language of Rule 10b-5. The legislative history for this provision makes clear
that Congress intended to “supplement the patchwork of existing technical securities law
violations with a more general and less technical provision, with elements and intent requirements
comparable to current bank fraud and health care fraud statutes.” S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 14
(2002); 148 CONG. REC. S7420 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy). However,
only a few recent cases have involved a charge of 18 U.S.C. § 1348 in insider trading cases. See
Peter J. Henning, A New Way To Charge Insider Trading, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/25/business/dealbook/a-new-way-to-charge-insidertrading.html [https://perma.cc/665R-8GFQ].
20. Only a few courts have heard this argument and decided that a Rule 10b-5 charge is
different from a § 1348 charge because only one requires willfulness. United States v. Jun Ying,
No. 1:18-cr-00074-AT-RGV, 2018 WL 7016349, at *2–3 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 17, 2018); United
States v. Hussain, No. 16-cr-00462-CRB-1, 2017 WL 4865562, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2017).
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is a difference between Rule 10b-5 and § 1348 based on the intent
requirement; violators of § 1348 must act “knowingly” and with the intent to
defraud, whereas Rule 10b-5 prosecutions require proof of willingness. 21
Second, and more importantly, the Second Circuit held that the court was not
required to import elements and definitions from § 10(b) jurisprudence
related to insider trading into its analysis under § 1348. In other words, the
Second Circuit held that it need not consider the decades of precedent related
to insider trading under Rule 10b-5 when opining on an insider trading charge
under § 1348. The result of this holding is that insider trading is easier to
prove under a criminal statute than the related civil statute and could mean
the end of the SEC’s role in policing insider trading given that the agency
only has civil authority to do so.
In Part I, this Article outlines the long jurisprudential arc of traditional
insider trading prosecutions under Rule 10b-5 and its dynamic elements
under common law. In Part II, this Article considers the legislative history
and the relatively scant common law background of § 1348 as applied to
insider trading prosecutions. Part III analyzes the use of § 1348 as both an
addition and a substitute for Rule 10b-5 prosecutions of insider trading. In
doing so, this Article first will address whether a dual charge for insider
trading under Rule 10b-5 and § 1348 is in violation of Blockburger; secondly,
Part III contemplates whether the judicial interpretation of insider trading as
hashed out in Rule 10b-5 cases should be imported into § 1348 caselaw.
Finally, in Part IV, this Article considers the policy ramifications of creating
a new insider trading regime under § 1348. This Part will consider the issue
that the burden for proving criminal insider trading under § 1348 will be
lower than proving the personal benefit test standard under Rule 10b-5,
thereby inverting civil and criminal standards for the same activity, among
other problematic ramifications. Given these potential ramifications and the
lack of concrete parameters for insider trading under § 1348, this Part
addresses whether the rule of lenity should apply to § 1348 prosecutions of
insider trading.
I.

INSIDER TRADING UNDER § 10(B) AND RULE 10B-5

Despite insider trading being a crime punishable by both fines and
incarceration, the underlying statute upon which liability is premised never
mentions the term “insider trading.” Instead, § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 states the following:
21. Sandra Moser & Justin Weitz, 18 U.S.C. § 1348—A Workhorse Statute for Prosecutors,
66 DEP’T JUST. J. FED. L. & PRAC. 111, 121 (2018).
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It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange . . . (b)
To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.22

When the SEC promulgated its related rule, Rule 10b-5, it also failed to
mention, define, or explicitly prohibit insider trading. The SEC Rule
attendant to the 1934 Exchange Act § 10(b) states,
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.23

At base, there are four critical elements to insider trading. First, the
information must be material;24 second, the information must be non22. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2018).
23. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2020). Some scholars have noted that the statute never intended
to prohibit insider trading. See Bainbridge, supra note 6, at n.24; Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement
of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1, 55–69 (noting the absence of congressional
concern regarding insider trading in the legislative history of the 1934 Act); see also Brief for
Petitioner at 21, Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016) (No. 15-628), 2016 WL 2732058.
24. The Supreme Court has said that information is material if “there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important” in making an investment
decision. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). This threshold is met
when a reasonable investor would consider the information as “having significantly altered the
‘total mix’ of information made available.” Id. Generally, certain categories of information will
meet the materiality threshold, including: (1) earnings reports; (2) mergers, acquisitions, tender
offers, joint ventures, or changes in assets; (3) new products, discoveries, or developments; (4)
changes in control or management; (5) change in auditors; (6) events regarding the issuer’s
securities; and (7) bankruptcies or receiverships. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65
Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,721 (Aug. 24, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249).
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public;25 third, the individual must trade on the basis of that
information;26 and fourth, in most cases, the individual must breach a
duty of trust or confidence owed to another individual or entity by
making the trade.27 Each of these four elements has emerged as a
result of litigation, meaning courts have defined and sharpened the
edges of the law.
With such an arguably vague statutory standard upon which to establish
liability for insider trading, the law of insider trading has been shaped almost
entirely by common law, in the form of SEC administrative actions and
judicial opinions.28 In fact, Rule 10b-5 was famously described by Justice
Rehnquist as “a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a
legislative acorn.”29 As a result, the contours of insider trading’s definition
and related prohibitions are vulnerable to sweeping changes depending upon
the different factual scenarios presented in each new case. The following
overview details the original cases related to insider trading and how the
common law has evolved in the past fifty years, which is critical to
understanding why insider trading is hard to pin down.

25. Courts have adopted two theories to determine whether information is public. Under the
first theory, information is public if it has been disseminated broadly to the investing public. SEC
v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968). Under the second theory, information
is public when it has been “fully impounded into the price of the particular stock.” United States
v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 601 (2d Cir. 1993). In 2000, the SEC clarified its position that
information on a company’s website is considered public where the disclosure is “reasonably
designed to provide broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the information to the public.” See
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,723 (adopting, among other things,
Regulation FD and Exchange Act Rule 10b5-2).
26. According to the SEC’s definition, a person is liable for insider trading under Rule 10b5 “if the person making the purchase or sale was aware of the material nonpublic information
when the person made the purchase or sale.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(b) (2020) (emphasis added).
27. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2020). Under classical and tipper-tippee theories, the insider
or tipper must violate a fiduciary duty to the company that typically exists due to the insider’s
position in the company. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983) (holding that “the
tippee’s duty to disclose or abstain is derivative from that of the insider’s duty”); Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980) (holding that “a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not
arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information”).
28. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Watching Insider Trading Law Wobble: Obus,
Newman, Salman, Two Martomas, and a Blaszczak 1 (Nov. 11, 2019) (unpublished manuscript),
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3227&context=facpub
[https://perma.cc/T6AM-8F82] (“[N]either the statute nor the rule addresses insider trading
explicitly, leaving to the judiciary to do all the work of fashioning legal doctrine about when and
why insider trading operates as securities fraud.”).
29. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
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A. Judicial Creation of Insider Trading: Cady, Roberts and Texas Gulf
Sulphur
In 1961, the SEC brought an enforcement action that created the
prohibition on insider trading.30 In a case of first impression, In re Cady,
Roberts & Co., the board of directors of the Curtiss-Wright Corporation
decided to reduce the company’s dividend.31 Cheever Cowdin, a director for
Curtis-Wright, was also a partner in the stock brokerage firm of Cady,
Roberts & Co.32 Cowdin told one of his partners, Robert Gintel, about the
dividend cut, and Gintel sold shares of Curtiss-Wright stock that were held
in customer accounts.33 The result was that Cady, Roberts’s customers
avoided significant loses because their Curtiss-Wright stock had been sold
before the dividend cut was made public.34
The SEC administrative court held that Gintel had violated Rule 10b-5,
despite not being the original insider who possessed the information. 35 The
administrative ruling detailed what became known as the “disclose or
abstain” rule, which holds that an insider in possession of material non-public
information must disclose the information before trading or abstain from
trading.36 The significance of Cady, Roberts is that it represents one of the
first cases cementing the prohibition against insider trading. However, Cady,
Roberts was an SEC administrative proceeding, not a criminal case, which
created questions of its precedential value.37
Eight years after Cady, Roberts, the Second Circuit weighed in on insider
trading and Rule 10b-5. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur was a seminal case that
solidified the “disclose or abstain” rule within securities law. 38 Unlike in
Cady, Roberts, the defendant in Texas Gulf Sulphur (“TGS”) was charged
with classical insider trading based on the following facts. In 1959, TGS, an
oil company, learned through ground surveys and ground samples that
30. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961); see also Donald C. Langevoort,
Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM.
L. REV. 1319, 1319 (1999).
31. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 908.
32. Id. at 909 n.4.
33. Id. at 909.
34. Id. at 909–10.
35. Id. at 916–17. See generally HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK
MARKET 12–15 (1966) (providing an in-depth discussion of the thought process and reasoning of
Professor William Cary, Chairman of the SEC and author of the opinion).
36. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 911.
37. See The SEC Takes Command in the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Company, SEC HIST.
SOC’Y,
http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/it/takeCommand_b.php#ftn17
[https://perma.cc/NF48-VRD8].
38. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
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significant deposits of copper and zinc lay in Ontario. 39 The president of TGS
failed to tell the other directors and employees about the information and
ordered the individuals involved in the exploration to keep quiet about the
discovery.40 TGS eventually acquired rights to the Ontario land and
announced the discovery in 1964.41 However, a number of insiders had
bought stock or options in 1963, prior to the announcement in April 1964. 42
Some insiders tipped outsiders. Others accepted stock options authorized by
the board without informing the directors of the discovery. Stock jumped
222% from November 1963 to May 1964.43
The Supreme Court denied cert in this case, leaving the Second Circuit
opinion to stand as the first federal ruling on what constitutes inside trading. 44
The Second Circuit held that if any individual has material non-public
information, she must either disclose that information or abstain from
trading.45 This case underscored the “equal access to information” policy as
the bedrock principle for investor protection and market integrity. The
Second Circuit agreed with the SEC that Rule 10b-5 was intended to assure
that “all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal
access to material information” and that “all members of the investing public
should be subject to identical market risks.” 46
B. Powell Jurisprudence and the Fiduciary Duty Test
The TGS “disclose or abstain” doctrine became the cardinal rule regarding
insider trading until the mid-1980s, when Justice Powell single-handedly
reshaped the law of insider trading. Through a pair of Supreme Court
decisions authored by Powell, insider trading shifted from being an absolute
bar on trading while in possession of inside information to becoming a more
complicated question regarding fiduciary duty and personal benefit. 47 The
two cases that created the new contours of insider trading remain the

39. Id. at 843.
40. Id. at 844.
41. Id. at 846.
42. Id. at 844.
43. Id. at 847.
44. See Hazen, supra note 11, at 891 n.49.
45. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 848.
46. Id. at 848, 852.
47. See, e.g., James D. Cox, Seeking an Objective for Regulating Insider Trading Through
Texas Gulf Sulphur, 71 SMU L. REV. 697, 699 (2018) (noting that after TGS, the rationale went
“from the clarity of parity of information to the mist of fiduciary duty”).
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architecture of insider trading law today.48 For this reason, a close look at
these cases is critical in order to grasp the nuances in the more recent case
law.
1.

Chiarella v. United States49

Chiarella was an employee of Pandick Press, a financial printer
company.50 Pandick used codes to conceal names of companies involved in
tender offer deals, but Chiarella broke the codes and purchased target
company shares before the bids were announced. 51 Chiarella was convicted
of insider trading in the district court, and the decision was affirmed by the
Second Circuit.52
The Supreme Court, with Justice Powell authoring the opinion, reversed
the conviction.53 The Court held that Chiarella had not committed insider
trading because he had no fiduciary relationship to the companies whose
stock he traded.54 Rather, the Court reasoned, Chiarella merely worked for
Pandick Press, which was not an agent of the companies. 55 The Court opined
that the lack of any fiduciary duty meant that there was no breach of duty,
and therefore no fraud. In what may be the most oft-quoted line that has
launched innumerable law review articles and scholarly debate, the Court
stated, “there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak.” 56
Powell’s decision in Chiarella represents the first outright rejection of the
“equal access to information” definition of insider trading. The “disclose or
abstain” bedrock principle from TGS became significantly narrowed after
Chiarella and required a duty that arises from a relationship of trust and
confidence between the parties. Powell underscores out that Chiarella was
not a fiduciary or an agent; he was a complete stranger to the companies in
which he traded stock. Because of this fact, Chiarella merely “happened

48. See, e.g., A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the
Federal Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841, 930 (2003) [hereinafter Pritchard, Counterrevolution
in the Federal Securities Laws]; Pritchard, supra note 7, at 18–22.
49. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
50. Id. at 224.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 225.
53. Id. at 224–25.
54. Id. at 231–33.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 235 (holding that “a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere
possession of nonpublic market information”).
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upon” inside information, which, the Court held, was not a violation of any
fiduciary duty and therefore did not give rise to the crime of insider trading. 57
The Chiarella opinion created shockwaves and garnered a variety of
criticisms. As Stephen Bainbridge summarized, “after Texas Gulf Sulphur,
the question was how large a net should the prohibition cast; after Chiarella,
the question was how broad should be the scope of immunity created by the
new fiduciary relationship requirement.”58 The Chiarella opinion was not
unanimous and included a vibrant dissent from Justices Marshall and
Blackmun, who argued that neither the statutory text nor the legislative
history supported the breach of duty requirement that Powell inserted. 59
Blackmun argued that securities laws are intended to ensure market fairness
broadly.60 He advocated for a broad rule banning the use of non-public
information not lawfully available to the market. 61 Chief Justice Burger also
dissented, arguing that illegal insider trading takes place whenever someone
trades with information obtained through unlawful means. 62 Interestingly,
Justices Brennan and Stevens concurred with the majority in reversing the
conviction but on a procedural issue that the jury had not been instructed
properly.63
2.

Dirks v. SEC64

The Powell decision in Chiarella set the stage for what remains the most
important case in insider trading law today. Dirks v. SEC created the morass
in which courts and litigants find themselves in now. The Dirks opinion
added a new relational element to tipper-tippee liability, which cannot be
57. Id. at 232–33. Under the misappropriation theory, the duty arises out of an agreement,
relationship, or course of conduct between the source of the information and the recipient that
requires the recipient to keep the information confidential. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan,
521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997) (holding that the misappropriation theory applies where an individual
misappropriates confidential information for the purpose of trading in a security in violation of a
duty owed to the source of the information). Under the “outsider trading” theory, there does not
need to be a duty (and breach) where an individual affirmatively misrepresents himself in order
to trade on a security. See SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2009).
58. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Law and Economics of Insider Trading: A Comprehensive
Primer,
(Feb.
2001)
(manuscript
at
18)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=261277 [https://perma.cc/A3HF-6D55].
59. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 245–46 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 248.
61. Id. at 249–50.
62. Id. at 239–40 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). This Chiarella dissent foreshadowed the
misappropriation theory established later in O’Hagan. See supra note 57.
63. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 237–39 (Stevens, J., concurring).
64. 463 U.S. 646, 648 (1983).
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defined cleanly, thus creating a new wrinkle in insider trading law with each
new case presented to a court.
The facts of Dirks are compelling and may explain why the Court created
an entirely new element of insider trading. Equity Funding Corp. of America
engaged in serious accounting fraud.65 Dirks was a securities analyst who
uncovered the fraud, thanks in part to Ronald Secrist, a former officer of
Equity Funding who had told Dirks about it. Dirks tried to alert the SEC to
report the fraud.66 He also contacted the Wall Street Journal (the “Journal”)
and leaked the story.67 The Journal refused to publish the story, claiming it
would be libelous.68 Dirks also told the fraud to some of his clients, and those
clients subsequently sold their holdings in Equity Funding. 69 Eventually, the
fraud at the company came to light, and the exchanges stopped trading on the
stock because of its drastic losses.70 The SEC, however, after its investigation
into Equity Funding, opened an investigation on Dirks, the whistleblower, for
insider trading because he told his clients about the information about Equity
Funding that he learned from Secrist.71
Dirks was found guilty of insider trading in the lower courts. 72 After all,
under the logic of TGS, his was a fairly open-shut case involving the
disclosure of material non-public information to his client, and they traded
on that information. Yet, at the time Dirks was decided, the Chiarella holding
was in force, requiring a fiduciary relationship, or at least a relationship of
trust a confidence, in order to meet the elements of insider trading. 73
For this reason, the Supreme Court reversed Dirks’ conviction, thereby
reaffirming the rejection of the TGS standard of equal access to information.
Justice Powell wrote for the majority and stated that there is no violation of
Rule 10b-5 absent a breach of fiduciary duty, echoing his opinion in
Chiarella.74 However, Powell went on to state that to prove a breach of
fiduciary duty, the government needs to show that the tipper received “a
monetary or personal benefit” either directly or indirectly.75 The tippee is
65. Id. at 649; see also A.C. Pritchard, Dirks and the Genesis of Personal Benefit, 68 SMU
L. Rev. 857, 857–58 (2015) (reviewing the Newman decision in light of the benefit test that arose
out of Dirks and analyzing the elements of the Dirks test).
66. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 648–49.
67. Id. at 649.
68. Id. at 649–50.
69. Id. at 650.
70. Id. at 650–51.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 651–52.
73. See id. at 654–55.
74. Id. at 654; Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
75. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667.
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equally liable if the tippee knows or should have known there has been a
breach of fiduciary duty.76 Based on this logic, the Court reasoned that Dirks
should not be found liable of insider trading because he did not receive any
personal benefit for the tip.77 In other words, the Court seemingly carved out
a whistleblower, or altruistic, exception for tipping material non-public
information.78
The term “personal benefit,” however, is not sufficiently specific and is
what has given rise to countless insider trading cases since Dirks. Justice
Powell gives three examples of what would be considered personal benefits
in the Dirks opinion: (1) “a pecuniary gain,” (2) “a reputational benefit that
will translate into future earnings,”79 and (3) “when an insider makes a gift of
confidential information to a trading relative or friend.” 80
C. Recent Challenges to Insider Trading Law
After the Dirks opinion, liability for insider trading under the tipper-tippee
theory requires the following elements to be present: (1) the tipper “has
breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the [material
non-public] information to the tippee,” (2) the tippee “knows or should know
that there has been a breach,” (3) the tippee uses the information in
connection with a securities transaction, and (4) the tipper obtained some
personal benefit in return.81 These elements were created nearly out of whole
cloth by common law, given that the statute underpinning insider trading
liability does not mention the term “insider trading.”82
Since Dirks, however, courts have taken a broad view of what can
constitute a “personal benefit.” For example, “personal benefit” can be as

76. Id. at 659–60.
77. Id. at 666.
78. Powell seems to have been motivated by over-zealous prosecution of insider trading and
that having a detrimental effect on market efficiency. He also thought this would chill the
incentives for analysts and other market professionals to uncover information about companies.
See Pritchard, supra note 65; Pritchard, Counterrevolution in the Federal Securities Laws, supra
note 48, at 931. Thus, in Powell’s mind, adequate price valuation is paramount, even if some
analysts need to learn info about company from insiders. See generally Nagy, supra note 5, at
1324–28 (arguing that this problem is better addressed through Reg FD and other measures).
79. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663–64.
80. Id. at 664; United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Dirks,
463 U.S. at 664).
81. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 647; see also SEC v. Ingram, 694 F. Supp. 1437, 1440 n.3 (C.D. Cal.
1988).
82. See supra Section I.A and accompanying notes.

52:0594]

[THE NEW INSIDER TRADING]

609

minimal as maintaining network contacts or personal relationships. 83 In
recent years, courts, including the Supreme Court, have reexamined the Dirks
standard without much clarification. Three recent cases spotlight the existing
confusion and disagreement on the current state of insider trading law, and
this Section addresses these three decisions in chronological order.
1.

United States v. Newman84

In 2014, the Second Circuit again considered the concept of a personal
benefit through the Dirks presumption of a gift to a “trading relative or friend”
and established that relational distance is a key factor in determining who
meets the definition of “friend.” The Newman case involved two long chains
of tippers and tippees. Todd Newman and Anthony Chiasson were portfolio
managers charged for trading based on material non-public information
related to NVIDIA and Dell stock.85 For the NVIDIA tipping chain, a member
of the NVIDIA finance unit disclosed material non-public information to an
acquaintance, who eventually told a securities analyst. 86 That particular
analyst told another analyst, who then tipped Newman and Chiasson. 87 A
similar story occurred for the Dell tipping chain: a member of the Dell
investor relations team disclosed information to Sandy Goyal, an analyst. 88
Goyal tipped another analyst who eventually tipped Newman and Chiasson.
Newman and Chiasson traded on the information and generated “lavish
profits for their respective funds.”89
Applying the Dirks standard, the Second Circuit held that the government
presented insufficient evidence to establish that either the NVIDIA or the
Dell insider received a personal benefit for the tip.90 The court stated that
while the personal benefit standard is “permissive,” it “does not suggest that
the [g]overnment may prove the receipt of a personal benefit by the mere fact
of a friendship, particularly of a casual or social nature.” 91 Thus, the distance
between the relationships among the tippers and tippees is what afforded
Newman and Chiasson immunity from liability.
83. See, e.g., SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003); SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d
68, 77 (1st Cir. 2000); SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 1995).
84. 773 F.3d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 2014).
85. Id. at 443.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 2015).
90. Newman, 773 F.3d at 442.
91. Id. at 452.
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The Newman court, therefore, created two distinct limitations to the
personal benefit test. The first was the relational distance. The court held that
a personal benefit does not exist absent a “meaningfully close personal
relationship.”92 Further, the court stated that the meaningfully close personal
relationship must generate “an exchange that is objective, consequential, and
represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable
nature.”93 In this second limitation, the personal benefit test is seemingly
swallowed by the pecuniary gain requirement. That is, according to Newman,
a personal benefit through a close relationship will likely have a pecuniary
gain element to it. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Newman but
addressed this second limitation in its decision in Salman, detailed below.
2.

Salman v. United States94

Although the Supreme Court declined to take up the Newman case to the
surprise of many commentators,95 it did agree to hear a subsequent case on
insider trading, Salman v. United States.96 In Salman, the defendant was
convicted of insider trading, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction. 97
The facts of the case involved Maher Kara, who worked for Citigroup
healthcare, informing his older brother, Michael Kara, about upcoming
mergers and acquisitions of Citigroup clients.98 Michael Kara was engaged to

92. Id. The Newman decision seemed to change the parameters of tipper-tippee liability,
which had been additionally shaped by a 2012 civil case, SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 279 (2d
Cir. 2012). In Obus, the Second Circuit interpreted the elements of tipper-tippee liability to allow
for tippees to be found guilty even if they were unaware of the tipper’s benefit. Id. at 287–88.
Newman “connect[ed] gift-giving and real benefit by demanding proof of a sufficiently close
relationship between tipper and tippee” and required that the tippee have “actual knowledge of
the breach and benefit.” Langevoort, supra note 28, at 4.
93. Newman, 773 F.3d at 452.
94. 137 S. Ct. 420, 424 (2016).
95. See generally Donna M. Nagy, Salman v. United States: Insider Trading’s Tipping
Point?, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 28 (2016), https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/salmanv-united-states-insider-tradings-tipping-point/ [https://perma.cc/24VN-349H]; A.C. Pritchard,
The SEC, Administrative Usurpation, and Insider Trading, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 55 (2016),
https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/the-sec-administrative-usurpation-and-insidertrading/ [https://perma.cc/RY43-UYKT].
96. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 420.
97. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir. 2015). Interestingly, Judge
Rakoff, who is a district judge in the Second Circuit, wrote the Ninth Circuit opinion because he
was sitting by designation. Id. This was yet another interesting intersection between the Second
and Ninth Circuits related to Newman and Salman.
98. Id. at 1088–89.
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Saswan Salman, the sister of the defendant, Bassam Salman.99 Michael Kara
passed on the inside information he learned from Maher to Bassam Salman. 100
Salman traded on the information and netted over one million dollars from
2004 to 2007 on trades based upon the material non-public information
obtained from Michael.101
At trial, the government presented evidence that Salman knew that Maher
Kara was the source of the inside information.102 Included in the
government’s evidence was proof that Michael told Maher he “owe[d]
somebody,” yet Michael turned down the offer for money from Maher and
instead took a tip about an upcoming acquisition.103 In other words, the tip of
inside information was given in lieu of cash.
Salman appealed his conviction based upon the decision in Newman,
arguing that Maher did not receive any pecuniary gain from tipping.104 In an
8-0 opinion, the Supreme Court held that the Dirks “personal benefit” test
had been met because Salman was a “trading relative or friend” by virtue of
being a brother-in-law of the insider.105 For this reason, the Court did not need
to delve into the question of whether there was any pecuniary gain for the
tipper, given the Dirks presumption of personal benefit through this type of
relationship.
Salman was an open-and-shut case that fell squarely within the definition
of personal benefit as laid out in Dirks. In many ways, Salman did not alter
anything about insider trading or clarify the law. The one takeaway from
Salman that provided clarity to the confusion among the lower courts was the
dicta that the relationship of a “trading relative or friend” does not need to
include a pecuniary gain.106 In that way, the second limitation imposed by the
Newman court—that the “meaningfully close personal relationship” must be
accompanied by the potential for pecuniary gain—was squarely rejected. 107

99. Id. at 1089.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. (alteration in original).
104. Id. at 1088.
105. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 422 (2016); see also Matthew C. Turk & Karen
E. Woody, Leidos and the Roberts Court’s Improvident Securities Law Docket, 70 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 89 (2017), https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/leidos-and-the-roberts-courtsimprovident-securities-law-docket/ [https://perma.cc/Q5EG-RVG8] (arguing that the Roberts
court had not issued many securities laws opinions that have moved the needle or elucidated
complex concepts).
106. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 422.
107. Id. at 421–22.
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United States v. Martoma108

On the heels of the Salman decision, the Second Circuit again revisited the
breadth of the personal benefit test through the “relational distance”
limitation. In Martoma, the defendant Martoma managed an investment
portfolio for the S.A.C. Capital Advisors, LLC (“SAC”). 109 In that capacity,
Martoma contacted doctors through an expert networking firm paid by
SAC.110 One of the doctors, Dr. Gilman, provided Martoma with confidential
updates on the safety of certain drugs and the results of clinical trials before
they were made public.111 Martoma and SAC traded on the information,
which resulted in approximately $80.3 million in gains and $194.6 million in
averted losses.112 Martoma was convicted for insider trading but appealed
based on the ruling in Newman.113 Martoma argued that he did not have a
“meaningfully close personal relationship” with Dr. Gilman, the insider, nor
had Dr. Gilman received any gain of pecuniary or similarly valuable nature. 114
The Martoma case, however, took an interesting twist. The Second Circuit
affirmed the conviction for reasons detailed below but amended its decision
nearly a year later.115 In the first opinion, “Martoma I,” the court held that the
“logic of Salman” abrogated Newman’s “meaningfully close personal
relationship” requirement.116 Essentially, the Martoma I court stated that
because Salman did not address the “meaningfully close personal
relationship” element due to the fact that the tipper-tippee relationship in
Salman was one of brothers-in-law, the element was no longer a requirement
for liability.117 Through some minor logical leaps, the Second Circuit decided
that nearly any relationship would meet the standard of tipper-tippee for
insider trading liability. In other words, Martoma I came very close to a
reversion to the TGS standard; meaning, any person trading on inside
information could be liable for insider trading.
Understandably, the defense bar howled after the Martoma I ruling, and
the stage seemed set for yet another cert petition on the elements of insider

108. United States v. Martoma (Martoma I), 869 F.3d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 2017), amended and
superseded by United States v. Martoma (Martoma II), 894 F.3d 64, 67–68 (2d Cir. 2018).
109. Martoma I, 869 F.3d at 61.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 62.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 64.
114. Id. at 64–65.
115. Martoma II, 894 F.3d 64, 68 (2d Cir. 2018).
116. Martoma I, 869 F.3d at 61.
117. Id. at 69.
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trading.118 Martoma himself appealed for a hearing en banc, and two highprofile amici briefs were filed, one on behalf of the New York Council of
Defense Lawyers, and the other by a group of prestigious law professors. 119
Combined, the amici represented a veritable “who’s who” of securities law
academics and practitioners, all of whom cried foul on the over-extension of
insider trading liability beyond the Dirks standard. As a result, the Second
Circuit panel amended its decision nearly 10 months after its initial opinion
(“Martoma II”).120 In the amended opinion, the court affirmed the conviction
but on the grounds that Dr. Gilman had been handsomely paid for his
consultations, meeting the “pecuniary gain” requirement for the personal
benefit test.121 The court backed off its abrogation of the “meaningfully close
personal relationship” test, seemingly with a recognition that such a
precedent would overrule Dirks.122
Martoma petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari and was
denied in June 2019.123 Thus, the opportunity to provide parameters to the
personal benefit test was avoided again this term. As described below,
however, the parameters for insider trading as defined by recent court
decisions may be wholly irrelevant.

118. David Miller & Grant McQueen, Martoma—The Latest Critical Insider Trading
Decision, LAW360 (June 27, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1057759/martoma-thelatest-critical-insider-trading-decision [https://perma.cc/8GQ5-TMK7].
119. Brief for Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, United States v.
Martoma, 894 F.3d 64 (2018) (No. 18-972), 2019 WL 991092, at *1; Brief for the New York
Council of Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellant’s Petition
for Rehearing En Banc, United States v. Martoma, 894 F.3d 64 (2018) (No. 14-3599), 2018 WL
4075999, at *1.
120. Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 67–68.
121. Id. at 79.
122. Id. at 71.
123. Martoma v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2665 (2019); Greg Stohr, Supreme Court Rejects
Martoma, Won’t Curb Insider Trading Cases, BLOOMBERG (June 3, 2019, 6:33 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-03/supreme-court-rejects-martoma-won-tcurb-insider-trading-cases [https://perma.cc/B5GH-TY4C].
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Table 1.
Personal Benefit Test Summary
Case

Court

Dirks

SCOTUS

Newman

2d Circuit

Salman

SCOTUS

Martoma I

2d Circuit

Martoma II

2d Circuit
(reissuance;
not en banc)

II.

Elements of Personal Benefit
Test
Powell’s three examples of a
personal benefit:
1. Pecuniary gain, OR
2. Reputational gain, OR
3. Presumption of benefit due
to close friend or family
member relationship
1. Relationship (Dirks’ #3)
must be meaningful and
close; AND
2. Include pecuniary gain,
essentially folding Dirks’ #3
into Dirks’ #1.

Abrogates Newman’s holding
that Dirks’ #3 (relationship
presumption) also requires
pecuniary gain.
Reads Salman’s abrogation of
Newman to mean that the
relationship of Dirks’ #3 does
not need to be close or
meaningful. Any relationship
will meet the Dirks’ #3 test.
Backtracks on previous holding
that any relationship creates a
presumption of personal benefit.
Holding stands because court
can find Dirks’ #1 (pecuniary
gain) = harmless error.

INSIDER TRADING UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 1348

This Article posits that much time and attention has been, and will
continue to be, paid to the necessary clarification of the personal benefit test,
yet there is potentially another way to prosecute insider trading without
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needing to prove the judicially created elements of the crime under Rule 10b5. While Rule 10b-5 establishes civil and criminal liability for securities
fraud, enforced by the SEC and the DOJ respectively, Congress passed
another securities fraud prohibition in 2002. 124 The provision, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1348, is found in the criminal code, and therefore only the DOJ can avail
itself of this charge.125 Section 1348, enacted as part of Sarbanes-Oxley, was
modeled after the mail and wire fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and § 1343,
and states
Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or
artifice–
(1) To defraud any person in connection with any commodity
for future delivery, or any option on a commodity for future
delivery, or any security of an issuer with a class of
securities registered under section 12 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, or that is required to file reports
under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
or
(2) To obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, any money or property in
connection with the purchase or sale of any commodity for
future delivery, or any option on a commodity for future
delivery, or any security of an issuer with a class of
securities registered under section 12 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, or that is required to file reports
under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
Shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than 25 years,
or both.126

The legislative history for this provision makes clear that Congress
intended to “supplement the patchwork of existing technical securities law
violations with a more general and less technical provision, with elements
and intent requirements comparable to current bank and health care fraud
statutes.”127 Senator Leahy explained that § 1348 was necessary because
there is no generally accessible statute that deals with the specific
problem of securities fraud. In these cases, federal investigators and
124. 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2018).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 14 (2002); 148 CONG. REC. S7420 (daily ed. July 26, 2002)
(statement of Sen. Leahy).

616

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

prosecutors are forced either to resort to a patchwork of technical
Title 15 offenses and regulations, which may criminalize particular
violations of securities law, or to treat the cases as generic mail or
wire fraud cases and to meet the technical elements of those statutes,
with their five year maximum penalties.128

Senator Leahy envisioned that § 1348 would “provide needed enforcement
flexibility and, in the context of publicly traded companies, protection against
all the types [of] schemes and frauds which inventive criminals may devise
in the future.”129
Section 1348’s language has marked similarities to that of Rule 10b-5,
despite the legislative history suggesting that § 1348 should be a broader,
more “flexible” prosecutorial tool than Title 15 and carry a weightier
sentence than the mail and wire fraud statutes. Indeed, § 1348 carries a
possible sentence of up to twenty-five years, which is higher than § 10(b). 130
Notably, as is the case with § 10(b), the language of § 1348 does not address
insider trading directly.
Moreover, the historical context of Sarbanes-Oxley should not be
overlooked. Sarbanes-Oxley was inherently a reaction to the Enron scandal
and the manipulation of energy markets that occurred as a result. 131
Commentators suggest that the Enron scandal, as well as that of Tyco and
Adelphia, contributed to a falling economy and stock market, in addition to
thousands of lost jobs.132 The size of the scandals and the growing sense that
there were no corporate ramifications for the actions of greedy corporations
and executives allowed for the bill to gain traction. Because of this, SarbanesOxley passed through Congress with a 99-0 vote in the Senate and a 423-3
vote in the House of Representatives. 133
Importantly, there is far less precedent for the application and
interpretation of § 1348 than for § 10(b), given that § 1348 was enacted just
under twenty years ago. Yet whether § 1348 should be applied to insider

128. 148 CONG. REC. S7420 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
129. Id.
130. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2018) with 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2018).
131. See, e.g., Phillip Wesley Lambert, Worlds Are Colliding: A Critique of the Need for the
Additional Criminal Securities Fraud Section in Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 839,
841 (2003).
132. Id. at 841 n.14 (noting that Sen. Levin’s statement made clear that only corporate
executives “escaped with millions of dollars” but that most of American households felt the
effects of the scandals) (citing 148 CONG. REC. S10,563 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2002) (statement of
Sen. Levin)).
133. Lambert, supra note 131, at 841.
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trading cases has been the source of recent debate, and only a few cases have
addressed this.
A. Conviction Under § 1348 and Acquittal Under § 10(b): United
States v. Blaszczak134
In United States v. Blaszczak, the Second Circuit was faced with
delineating securities fraud under § 10(b) and § 1348. The facts of the case
are as follows. Blaszczak obtained material non-public information from
Christopher Worrall, a government employee at the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS).135 CMS is responsible for setting the Medicare
reimbursement rates for healthcare providers. 136 Blaszczak was a former
employee of CMS and met Worrall in that capacity.137 According to the
indictment, from 2009 to 2014, Worrall informed Blaszczak about upcoming
CMS reimbursement cuts for particular radiation treatments and dialysis
treatments.138 Blaszczak relayed the information to Robert Olan and
Theodore Huber, both employees of Deerfield Management Company L.P.,
a healthcare-focused hedge fund.139 Olan and Huber shorted stocks that would
be affected by the changes in reimbursement policy. 140 According to the
government, Deerfield “reaped more than $7 million in profits” as a result of
the trades.141
The government charged defendants with violations of securities fraud
under both Rule 10b-5 and § 1348, conversion of government property under
18 U.S.C. § 641, wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and conspiracy to
commit securities fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 371.142 After a month-long jury
trial in May 2018, Worrall was convicted of wire fraud and conversion of
government property but was acquitted of securities fraud under both Rule
10b-5 and § 1348.143 The traders Olan and Huber were found guilty of
securities fraud under § 1348 but were acquitted of securities fraud under
134. 947 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir. 2019).
135. Id. at 27.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 26.
140. Id. at 27.
141. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Four Defendants Sentenced Following Convictions at
Trial for Stealing Confidential Government Information and Using It To Engage in Illegal Trading
(Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/four-defendants-sentenced-followingconvictions-trial-stealing-confidential-government [https://perma.cc/J7JW-ZJ3T].
142. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 46 (Kearse, J., dissenting).
143. See id. at 29–30 (majority opinion).
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Rule 10b-5.144 Similarly, Blaszczak, who was the “middle man” or
intermediate tippee, was acquitted of securities fraud under Rule 10b-5 but
found guilty under § 1348.145 In other words, the jury awarded convictions
for securities fraud only under § 1348 and not Rule 10b-5, despite the charges
emanating from the same set of facts and activity.
The explanation of the convictions at the district court in Blaszczak lies in
the potentially problematic jury instructions. The jury instructions for Rule
10b-5 consisted of nearly twenty pages of transcript and required the jury to
address ten specific issues related to whether the defendants had a duty of
trust and confidence to CMS, whether there was a personal benefit granted in
the exchange of information, and whether the tippees knew of that personal
benefit.146 In short, if the jury answered “no” to any of the questions related
to the elements of Rule 10b-5, it would acquit the defendants on that
charge.147 In contrast, the jury instructions related to § 1348 were more sparse
and consisted of only four pages of the transcript.148 The government only
needed to show that there was a “scheme or artifice to defraud,” intent to
defraud, and a connection to the purchase or sale of a security. 149
The defendants appealed on several grounds, including that the district
court erred by not instructing the jury that the Dirks personal benefit test
applied to the wire fraud and § 1348 fraud counts. 150 On December 30, 2019,
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. Id. at 29; Antonia M. Apps & Katherine R. Goldstein, Can the Government Circumvent
“Newman’s”
Personal
Benefit
Test?,
262
N.Y.
L.J.
1,
2
(2019),
https://www.milbank.com/images/content/1/2/v2/126268/NYLJ-12.02.2019-Milbank.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2TY6-3PDE].
147. Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors at 3–5, United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19
(2d Cir. 2019) (No. 18-2811, 18-2825, 18-2867, 18-2878), 2019 WL 1200033.
148. Elkan Abramowitz & Jonathan S. Sack, Back to the Future: Criminal Insider Trading
Under Title 18, 260 N.Y. L.J. 1, 2 (2018), https://www.maglaw.com/publications/articles/201807-03-back-to-the-future-criminal-insider-trading-under-title18/_res/id=Attachments/index=0/Back%20to%20the%20Future%20%20Criminal%20Insider%20Trading%20Under%20Title%2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/8L4HCS2T].
149. Id.
150. One of the other grounds for appeal involved the question of whether the CMS’s
confidential information constituted “property” that was a “thing of value.” The dissent by Judge
Kearse focused on this point in its disagreement with the majority. Specifically, Judge Kearse
agreed with defendants that the convictions should be vacated because the information on which
defendants traded involved government reimbursement rates for certain medical treatments.
Kearse underscored that CMS is a regulatory agency, and that is distinguishable from Carpenter,
upon which the majority relied. Kearse wrote that premature disclosure of CMS’s pre-decisional
regulatory information did not render CMS a victim or “deprived of anything that could be
considered property.” Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 46–47 (Kearse, J., dissenting).
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the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s convictions, focusing its
reasoning on the embezzlement, or misappropriation, theory. Citing
O’Hagan, the court stated “[t]he undisclosed misappropriation of
confidential information, in breach of a fiduciary duty or similar duty of trust
and confidence, ‘constitutes fraud akin to embezzlement.’” 151
The Second Circuit went further, however, in stating that the Dirks
personal benefit test is “judge-made doctrine premised on the Exchange Act’s
statutory purpose” which, the Second Circuit declared, differs from the
purpose of § 1348.152 Section 1348 was “intended to provide prosecutors with
a different—and broader—enforcement mechanism to address securities
fraud than what had been previously provided in the Title 15 fraud
provisions.”153
What the Second Circuit misses is that insider trading is not civil securities
fraud unless it meets the elements of the Dirks personal benefit test. To hold
that it is criminal fraud under § 1348 creates a panoply of issues, discussed
in Part V. Defendants addressed this issue in their appeal, and the Second
Circuit dismissed this policy argument by stating that “[t]he Federal Criminal
Code is replete with provisions that criminalize overlapping conduct” and
that “Congress was certainly authorized to enact a broader securities fraud
provision.”154
The Blaszczak case represents one of the first instances wherein a jury
convicted a defendant of insider trading under § 1348 but declined to convict
under Rule 10b-5. The Second Circuit’s affirmance of that decision
represents a marked shift in insider trading doctrine and is one of the only
cases to have considered whether insider trading violates § 1348. The only
other recent cases arose from the Northern District of Georgia and are
described below.
B. Insider Trading Charged Only Under § 1348
As noted above, there have been scant prosecutions for insider trading
under § 1348. One particular federal court, the Northern District of Georgia,
has heard two, and both cases charged violations of only § 1348 and not §
10(b).

151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 28 (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997)) (majority opinion).
Id. at 35–36.
Id. at 36–37.
Id. at 37.
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United States v. Slawson155

Slawson was the co-founder of Titan Capital Management, an investment
company that managed assets of TCMP3 Partners, L.P., a hedge fund. 156 In
2014, a federal grand jury indicted Slawson on thirty-six counts, including §
1343 (wire fraud), § 1348, and § 1349 (conspiracy). 157 The prosecutors opted
not to charge securities fraud under Rule 10b-5.158 The indictment alleged that
Slawson was the recipient of inside information about the children’s clothing
company, Carter’s Inc.159 Specifically, Slawson received material non-public
information about quarterly and annual earnings for Carter’s Inc. from a
retired analyst, who himself had received the information from two insiders
at Carter’s.160 Slawson then traded on the information.161 The indictment
alleged the insiders disclosed the information in violation of fiduciary duties,
expectations of confidentiality, Carter’s written policies, and agreements to
maintain confidentiality.162
For the § 1348 charge, the indictment alleged that Slawson knowingly and
willfully executed and attempted to execute a “scheme . . . to defraud others
in connection with Carter’s Inc. stock securities and . . . to obtain by false and
fraudulent pretenses, representations and promises, money and property in
connection with the purchase and sale of [those] securities” through
misappropriated information.163 The indictment further alleged that Slawson
knew that the information had been disclosed in violation of fiduciary
duties.164
Slawson moved to dismiss the indictment for failing to allege an essential
element of the crimes charged. 165 Specifically, Slawson argued that the
indictment failed to allege that he knew that either of the alleged insider
tippers received any personal benefit in connection with passing along
material non-public information.166 In other words, Slawson, a remote tippee,
hewed to the definition of tipper-tippee insider trading outlined in Dirks. In

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

No. 1:14–CR–00186–RWS–JFK, 2014 WL 5804191 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 7, 2014).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *1–2.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
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response, the government argued that Slawson was not charged with
violations of § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5. 167
The magistrate judge agreed with the government, holding that the
indictment properly presented the essential elements of the charges. 168 The
court noted that Slawson relied on statutes, regulations, and case law
interpreting § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, yet Slawson failed to offer “a single legal
authority applying that case law to the Title 18 securities fraud violations
alleged in th[e] indictment.”169 For that reason, the magistrate held that there
was no reason to import the definitions of tipper-tippee insider trading as
litigated under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 into a case wherein only § 1348
securities fraud had been charged.170 The magistrate judge’s Report and
Recommendation was later approved and adopted as the opinion of the trial
court.171
2.

United States v. Melvin172

The Melvin case builds upon Slawson and involved another instance
wherein prosecutors charged insider trading under § 1348 but declined to
charge violations of § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5. Like Slawson, the Melvin court
involved a report and recommendation from a magistrate judge in the
Northern District of Georgia;173 that report was then reviewed by the district
court judge.174 Melvin was a CPA in Georgia, and his codefendants, Berry,
Cain, and Jinks, were clients and friends.175 Melvin also provided accounting
services to one of the board members of Chattem, Inc., an over-the-counter
167. Id. at *4.
168. Id. at *8.
169. Id. at *6. The court in a later section of its opinion, denying Slawson’s motion for a bill
of particulars, reiterated this sentiment:
Again, Defendant relies primarily on case law involving allegations of
wrongdoing pursuant to the Security Exchange Act, from outside this district,
to argue that the information he seeks is necessary for an ‘insider trading case.’
Defendant’s arguments are undermined by his continued misplaced reliance
on decisions addressing charges and based on statutes and regulations not at
issue in this case.
Id. at *11 (internal citations omitted).
170. Id. at *6–7.
171. Id. at *20.
172. 143 F. Supp. 3d 1354 (N.D. Ga. 2015).
173. United States v. Melvin, No. 3:14–cr–00022–TCB–RGV, 2015 WL 7116737, at *1
(N.D. Ga. May 27, 2015).
174. Melvin, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 1360.
175. Id. at 1360–61.
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pharmaceutical manufacturer.176 Chattem entered discussions with SanofiAventis, a large French pharmaceutical company, about a potential
acquisition.177 Melvin learned of the upcoming acquisition through his
interactions with the board member of Chattem and then disclosed the
information to the codefendants.178
Melvin moved to dismiss the indictment for failure to allege a crime,
among other reasons.179 Melvin and his codefendants argued that the
indictment failed to allege that Melvin received a personal benefit from the
disclosure of information, as required by the insider trading jurisprudence
under Rule 10b-5.180 The magistrate judge, relying upon Slawson, “decline[d]
to impose on the charges set forth in the indictment the requirement to plead
elements of offenses not charged in the indictment.” 181 The district court
judge affirmed, noting that defendants “ha[d] not offered any authority that
expressly indicates the elements required to prove an insider trading violation
under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 should be imported into § 1348.” 182 Moreover,
the district judge underscored that the purpose of § 1348 was to “broaden the
range of conduct proscribed by existing federal securities laws” and that the
statute “was modeled on the mail and wire fraud statutes, not on the Exchange
Act.”183
Despite the court’s clear language refusing to consider the elements of §
10(b) in a § 1348 case, the district court, unnecessarily, went on to state that
the indictment likely would not fail even if the court incorporated the
elements of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.184 The court relied upon the O’Hagan
misappropriation theory185 to discredit defendants’ argument that the Chattem
board member, not Melvin, was the actual tipper. 186 Then the court waded
further into a discussion of Rule 10b-5 elements when addressing defendants’
reliance upon Newman and the failure of the indictment to allege any personal
176. Id. at 1361.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. United States v. Melvin, No. 3:14–cr–00022–TCB–RGV, 2015 WL 7116737, at *1, *8
(N.D. Ga. May 27, 2015).
180. Id. at *8.
181. Id. at *9 (quoting United States v. Slawson, No. 1:14–CR–00186–RWS–JFK, 2014 WL
5804191, at *7 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 7, 2014)).
182. Melvin, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 1374.
183. Id. at 1375 (internal citation omitted).
184. Id.
185. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997) (holding that the
misappropriation theory applies where an individual misappropriates confidential information for
the purpose of trading in a security in violation of a duty owed to the source of the information).
186. Melvin, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 1375.
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benefit.187 The court shrugged off Newman as “not binding authority” and
stated that it would use the Dirks definition of a benefit, which can include
enhancement of one’s reputation or a gift to a trading relative or friend. 188
Thus, despite holding that the elements of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are
irrelevant to charges brought under § 1348, the court nevertheless undertook
the intellectual exercise of grappling with the definitions of insider trading as
elucidated under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
These cases represent the bare landscape of cases in which insider trading
charges were brought under § 1348 rather than Rule 10b-5, and the court in
both instances made clear that importation of Rule 10b-5 elements into §
1348 interpretation was inappropriate.
III.

THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN § 1348 AND RULE 10B-5

The Blaszczak case brings up a few distinct issues with respect to the
intersection between § 1348 and Rule 10b-5. The first is one of doublecharging, or multiplicity of charges. The second involves the connection
between Rule 10b-5 charges for insider trading and mail and wire fraud
charges for insider trading. Finally, and likely most significant, is whether the
Blaszczak court erred by not importing definitions and principles specific and
unique to insider trading that have been fleshed out in Rule 10b-5
jurisprudence. This Part addresses these matters in turn.
A. Multiplicity of Charges
The Blaszczak case involved charges of both §§ 1348 and 10(b), but the
jury only convicted the defendants on violations of § 1348. This is a marked
difference from the two Georgia cases listed above, Slawson and Melvin,
which did not include a § 10(b) charge at all.189 In the case of Blaszczak,
where prosecutors charge Rule 10b-5 criminally, as well as § 1348, there is a
potential risk of multiplicity of charges; that is, charging a defendant under
different statutes for the exact same conduct, without an additional fact.
187. Id. at 1376.
188. Id.
189. Although the Slawson case did not involve a criminal Rule 10b-5 charge, Slawson also
raised the issue of double jeopardy in relation to the SEC’s attendant civil suit that followed on
the heels of his criminal conviction. Slawson’s argument failed because there is no double
jeopardy risk when one of the matters is a civil action. Double jeopardy only applies to multiple
criminal actions. That said, it is true that a Rule 10b-5 case can be brought as either a civil or
criminal action. For this reason, Slawson’s argument ultimately failed. See infra notes 183–93
regarding double jeopardy issues at play between § 10(b) and § 1348 charges.
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Another recent case out of the Northern District of Georgia addressed this
very issue. In United States v. Ying, the government charged Ying with both
§ 1348 and § 10(b) violations in relation to trades in Equifax. 190 Ying’s case
was one of classical insider trading, not tipper-tippee. In his motion to
dismiss, Ying raised the issue that his indictment was multiplicitous because
it charged Ying with the same offense in two separate counts, in violation of
the Blockburger rule.191 Citing Blockburger, the court stated that the test
establishes that each provision or count requires proof of a fact that the other
does not.192 The district court affirmed the magistrate’s ruling on the motion
to dismiss, noting that the magistrate had determined that a violation of
§ 10(b) requires proof of willfulness, whereas a violation of § 1348 does
not.193
In appealing the magistrate ruling, Ying relied upon an Eleventh Circuit
case that stated that a conviction for aiding and abetting bank fraud requires
“the same willfulness and unlawful intent as the actual perpetrators of the
fraud” to show that willfulness is required for the sister provisions § 1348,
including mail, wire, and bank fraud.194 Adopting somewhat circular
reasoning, the court rejected Ying’s argument, stating that Ying had cited no
legal authority that “finds that § 1348 does require proof of willfulness.”195
Moreover, the court explained, the precedent upon which Ying relied did not

190. No. 1:18-CR-74-AT, 2018 WL 6322308, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 4, 2018). The Ying case
is most interesting in light of another issue that is beyond the scope of this paper but that I will
briefly describe here. Ying was an employee of Equifax who was never told about the Equifax
data breach. Rather, Equifax had explicitly lied to Ying and told him that the data breach he was
working on was for an Equifax client. As Ying, Chief Information Officer, was working on the
hypothetical breach, he allegedly “put 2 and 2 together” and sold his stock prior to the public
announcement of the data breach, thereby avoiding losses of over $117,000. This case marks one
of the only times the government has moved forward on an insider trading charge with the theory
of “constructive knowledge” imputed to an insider, and that knowledge being the basis of the
insider trading charge. Daniel A. Goldfried, Does United States v. Ying Expand the Knowledge
Requirement for “Classical” Insider Trading?, SUBJECT TO INQUIRY (Apr. 2, 2018),
https://www.subjecttoinquiry.com/enforcement-and-prosecution-policy-and-trends/does-unitedstates-v-ying-expand-the-knowledge-requirement-for-classical-insider-trading/
[https://perma.cc/Z4VD-X8NP].
191. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 303–04 (1932) (establishing a test to
determine whether two statutory provisions prohibit the same conduct, which would violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause); Ying, 2018 WL 6322308, at *6. See generally Abram Olchyk, A Spoof
of Justice: Double Jeopardy Implications for Convictions of Both Spoofing and Commodities
Fraud for the Same Transaction, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 239, 245 (2015).
192. Ying, 2018 WL 6322308, at *6.
193. Id.
194. Id. (quoting United States v. Teers, 591 F. App’x. 824, 843 (11th Cir. 2014)).
195. Id. (emphasis in original).
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involve a charge under § 1348.196 Ultimately, the court held that the lack of
the word “willful” in the plain language of § 1348 stands in direct contrast to
the presence of the word “willful” in § 10(b).197 That difference, according to
the court, was enough to render § 1348 and § 10(b) different charges for
purposes of the Blockburger test.
In Ying, the magistrate judge relied upon another unreported case that
highlighted that criminal liability requires a showing of willfulness under
Rule 10b-5 but not under § 1348.198 Indeed, the Ying interpretation of the
overlap between § 1348 and § 10(b) has some followers. Two former acting
chiefs of the DOJ Fraud Division penned an article in October 2018 lauding
§ 1348 as “a workhorse statute for prosecutors.”199 In that article, they
highlight that one of the differences and benefits for charging § 1348 is that
the mens rea requirement “appears to be lower” than a criminal violation of
Rule 10b-5 because § 1348 merely requires that a defendant act “knowingly,”
whereas Rule 10b-5 prosecutions require proof of willfulness. 200 The
fraudulent intent required for § 1348 prosecutions, like mail and wire fraud
prosecutions, “may be inferred from the scheme itself.” 201
While the issue of multiplicity of charges seems to be settled by the plain
reading of the statutes, congressional intent, and language from a few—albeit
unreported—cases, the issue that repeatedly comes to the fore is when courts
should look to definitions and interpretations of securities fraud under § 10(b)
or to the precedence established under mail and wire fraud statutes, discussed
below.

196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. (citing United States v. Hussain, No. 16-cr-00462-CRB-1, 2017 WL 4865562, at *8
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2017)).
199. See Moser & Weitz, supra note 21, at 111.
200. Id. at 121 (citing Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 136–37 (1994) (noting that “the
willfulness requirement mandates something more . . . ‘the Government must prove that the
defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful’”)). Moser and Weitz suggest that
this difference in mens rea requirements is consistent with the congressional intent of § 1348. Id.
at 121 n.32 (citing COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE CORPORATE AND CRIMINAL FRAUD
ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2002, S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 6 (2002) (“[P]rosecutors may charge a
willful violation of certain specific securities laws or regulations, but such regulations often
contain technical legal requirements, and proving willful violations of these complex regulations
allows defendants to argue that they did not possess the requisite criminal intent. There is no
logical reason for imposing such awkward and heightened burdens on the prosecution of criminal
securities fraud cases.” (quoting S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 6 (2002))).
201. Id. (quoting United States v. Motz, 652 F. Supp. 2d 284, 296 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)).
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B. Elephants in the Room: Mail and Wire Fraud Charges for Insider
Trading and the Misappropriation Theory
There is a viable argument that the potential end-around of § 10(b) insider
trading via § 1348 is not a novel strategy. 202 Prosecutors have long been able
to charge insider trading under mail and wire fraud, §§ 1341, 1343, upon
which § 1348 was modeled.203 The following discussion addresses the
instances wherein courts have allowed liability for mail and wire fraud in
conjunction with Rule 10b-5 charges for insider trading, premised upon the
misappropriation theory.

202. William K.S. Wang, Application of the Federal Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes to
Criminal Liability for Stock Market Insider Trading and Tipping, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 220, 234
(2015).
203. Id. at 227 n.16. (listing the number of cases charging insider trading in conjunction with
mail and wire fraud charges). The text of the mail and wire fraud statutes is, unsurprisingly,
markedly similar to that of § 1348. Section 1341 states,
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange,
alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any
counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything
represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious
article, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so
to do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any
matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or
deposits or causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever to be sent or
delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or receives
therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by
mail or such carrier according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which
it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such
matter or thing, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20
years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2018).
Similarly, the text for § 1343 states:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted
by means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign
commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of
executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than 20 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2018).
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Carpenter v. United States

The 1987 Supreme Court case of Carpenter v. United States is one of the
most significant cases wherein mail and wire fraud charges were brought,
along with § 10(b) charges, for insider trading activity.204 In Carpenter, one
of the defendants was a reporter for the Journal who regularly interviewed
corporate executives in order to write summaries about various stocks in a
column called “Heard on the Street.”205 None of the information in the
Journal articles contained inside information, but the “Heard on the Street”
column had the potential to affect the price of the stocks that it discussed. 206
At issue in Carpenter was the fact that the information in “Heard on the
Street” was the Journal’s confidential information.207 The defendants entered
into a scheme to trade on the information that would be “Heard on the Street”
prior to publication and netted profits of nearly $690,000. 208
The defendants argued that they had not engaged in a scheme to defraud,
nor had they obtained any money or property from the Journal, as is required
under the mail and wire fraud statutes.209 Further, the defendants argued that
the Journal did not have any interest in the securities that were traded; that
is, the Journal was not a buyer or seller of the stocks.210 Thus, defendants
argued that § 10(b) should not apply because the Journal was only the alleged
victim of a fraud and therefore could not meet the element that this activity
was “in connection with a purchase or sale of securities.”211 The district court
found that the breach of confidentiality by the author of “Heard on the Street”
by misappropriating prepublication information was sufficient to constitute a
breach of § 10(b).212 The Second Circuit affirmed.213 Likewise, the Second
Circuit also affirmed the mail and wire convictions based upon the
misappropriated property interest in the information, which fell within the
elements of the mail and wire statutes.214

204. 484 U.S. 19, 21–22 (1987).
205. Id. at 22.
206. Id. at 27–28.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 23.
209. Id. at 25. Defendants relied upon the holding in McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350,
360 (1987), which established that the mail fraud statute is limited to the protection of property
rights, not intangible rights.
210. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 24.
211. Id. at 22–24.
212. Id. at 25–26.
213. Id. at 22–24.
214. Id.
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The Supreme Court was evenly split on the decision regarding the § 10(b)
charges215 and therefore affirmed the Second Circuit’s holding that found the
defendants liable for insider trading under § 10(b).216 Interestingly, despite
being evenly split on the § 10(b) charges, the Court was unanimous in
upholding the convictions for mail and wire fraud. Specifically, the Court
affirmed the Second Circuit’s opinion that the Journal’s confidential business
information was the property of the Journal.217 The Court stated that a scheme
to defraud does not require monetary loss; rather, it “is sufficient that the
Journal has been deprived of its right to exclusive use of the information, for
exclusivity is an important aspect of confidential business information.” 218
The Carpenter case and its progeny tees up a question about the necessity
for § 1348. Meaning, securities fraud would fall under mail and wire fraud
whenever the defendant used either the mail or the wires; therefore, how is
§ 1348 not always superfluous? The answer perhaps lies in the plain reading
of the statutes. Section 1348 prohibits securities fraud by requiring the fraud
to be linked to the sale of a security. In addition, the statute of limitations is
different for § 1348 than it is for §§ 1341 and 1343. 219
Despite the outcome of Carpenter and the high-profile victory for the
government in charging mail and wire fraud for insider trading, there have
been a number of notable insider trading cases that did not include additional
charges of mail and wire fraud.220 Among those are both the Newman and
Martoma cases.221 More interestingly, another high-profile defendant, Raj
Rajaratnam, was never charged with any Title 18 offenses, despite having a
215. The court was split 4-4 because Justice Powell, who argued to grant certiorari in order
to reject the misappropriation theory, retired before the case was argued. Interestingly, Powell
had written at the cert stage that Carpenter’s conduct was not illegal because there was no duty of
trust or confidence between the parties to the transaction in Carpenter. See Fair to All People:
the SEC and the Regulation of Insider Trading, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION HIST. SOC’Y,
http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/it/counterAttack_d.php [https://perma.cc/464A5BC5].
216. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 24.
217. Id. at 26 (citing Ruckelshuas v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1001–04 (1984); Dirks v. SEC,
463 U.S. 646, 653 (1983); Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 250–
51 (1905) (for the principle that confidential business information is recognized as property)).
218. Id. at 26–27. Carpenter paved the way for the property-rights theory of
misappropriation, which was ensconced in the law in United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642,
677–78 (1997). Because the Carpenter court was split 4-4, thereby affirming the Second Circuit
through inertia, the O’Hagan case cemented the misappropriation theory in 1997.
219. Moser & Weitz, supra note 21, at 122.
220. See Abramowitz & Sack, supra note 148 (listing recent high-profile insider trading cases
that did not include a Title 18 charge, such as United States v. Rajaratnam, United States v. Goffer,
United States v. Gupta, United States v. Newman, United States v. Martoma).
221. Id.
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judge order a wiretap and electronic surveillance based on predicate Title 18
offenses, including mail fraud and money laundering.222
A broader question is whether the Carpenter decision is correct in its
seemingly bifurcated definition of fraud. The Court rendered a unanimous
decision that Carpenter was guilty of mail and wire fraud, while punting on
whether he was guilty of securities fraud. In other words, according to the
Carpenter Court, “fraud” under the mail and wire statute did not mean the
same thing as it did under § 10(b). Notably, Powell’s absence on the Court
was the reason that the Second Circuit’s conviction for § 10(b) was upheld
due to a divided court, yet we know from Powell’s cert opinion that he was
against the imposition of § 10(b) liability for Carpenter. 223
2.

United States v. O’Hagan

The somewhat shaky theory decided by a split court underlying the insider
trading conviction in Carpenter was further ensconced in the law through the
O’Hagan decision in 1997.224 O’Hagan was a partner at Dorsey & Whitney
law firm.225 Dorsey & Whitney represented Grand Metropolitan PLC (Grand
Met) in Grand Met’s tender offer for the common stock of Pillsbury
Company.226 O’Hagan was not involved in the Grand Met takeover
representation but learned of it through conversations with a Dorsey &
Whitney partner handling the representation. 227 O’Hagan then purchased
stock in the target company, Pillsbury, prior to the announcement of the
tender offer and made a profit of over $4.3 million.228 Under these facts,
O’Hagan was not an insider of the company in which he traded, nor did he
owe Pillsbury or its shareholder a duty of trust or confidence. For this reason,
the classical theory of insider trading under Chiarella and Dirks would not
have supported prosecution for insider trading. 229

222. Id. (citing United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09-Cr-1184, 2010 WL 4867402, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010) (denying the defense’s motion to suppress the evidence gained from
the wiretap)).
223. See Fair to All People: the SEC and the Regulation of Insider Trading, supra note 215;
see also Pritchard, supra note 7, at 58.
224. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 646–47 (1997).
225. Id. at 647.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 648 n.1.
228. Id. at 648.
229. See Donna Nagy, Beyond Dirks: Gratuitous Tipping and Insider Trading, 42 J. CORP.
L. 1, 18 (2016).
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Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, upheld O’Hagan’s conviction
for insider trading under the misappropriation, or embezzlement, theory that
O’Hagan breached a duty of loyalty to the source of the information (his law
firm) in connection with a purchase or sale of a security. 230 Justice Ginsburg
underscored that the “fraud on the source” theory was in line with the purpose
of securities laws to promote investor confidence and ensure honest securities
markets.231 In doing so, Justice Ginsburg moved away from the Powell
jurisprudence and seemingly back to a general fairness principle detailed in
the pre-Chiarella opinions.232
O’Hagan was not a tipper-tippee case but instead was an “outsider”
trading case because O’Hagan did not have any relation to the company in
whose stock he traded. Professor Donna Nagy points out that the O’Hagan
logic can be extended to include tippers as misappropriators.233 However, for
tippees, the government must prove the breach of a duty to the owner of the
misappropriated information by the tipper, and the knowledge that the tipper
had breached that duty.234
Three Justices dissented in O’Hagan. Interestingly, Justice Scalia
suggested that the rule of lenity should apply § 10(b) to require the
manipulation or deception of a party to the securities transaction.235 Justice
Thomas, with whom Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in dissent, argued that
the fraud on the source was not sufficiently linked to the securities
transaction. In other words, Justice Thomas wrote that even the government
conceded that had O’Hagan merely stole funds with which he bought stock,
rather than information, there would not be a sufficient nexus to show a
violation of § 10(b)’s requirement of “in connection with the sale or purchase
of a security.”236
Most importantly for purposes of this paper, however, is Justice Thomas’s
final two paragraphs in dissent, in which he states, “With regard to
respondent’s convictions on the mail fraud counts, my view is that they may
be sustained regardless of whether respondent may be convicted of the

230. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653.
231. Id. at 658.
232. Id.; Nagy, supra note 229, at 19; see also Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 1648 (suggesting
that O’Hagan represents a reversion to the “equal access” theory of insider trading).
233. Nagy, supra note 229, at 20.
234. Id. (citing United States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226, 234 (2d Cir. 2001)). Justice
Sotomayor authored this opinion when she was a member of the Second Circuit.
235. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 679 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also
infra Part IV.C. (discussing the application of the rule of lenity).
236. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 681–82 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

52:0594]

[THE NEW INSIDER TRADING]

631

securities fraud counts.”237 Thomas then states that he does not see much
factual difference between O’Hagan and Carpenter on that point and would
have held that it is not problematic that the mail fraud and securities fraud
counts are predicated on the same factual basis. 238 Herein lies a potential
issue. “Fraud” under § 10(b), in Justice Thomas’s mind, did not exist in
O’Hagan. Fraud under § 1343, however, did. Arguably, had the government
charged § 1348 (had it existed at the time of O’Hagan), it follows that
Thomas and his other dissenters may have held O’Hagan guilty for general
securities fraud under that statute.
C. Importing § 10(b) Jurisprudence into § 1348 Caselaw
As discussed in Part II, the Blaszczak, Slawson and Melvin cases represent
the first cases wherein a court considered whether the elements of § 10(b)
should be applied to § 1348 charges. 239 In all of those cases, the court held
that there was no reason to consider elements outside of those required for
the charge of securities fraud under § 1348. Three other cases suggest some
overlap of § 10(b) and § 1348 may occur. These cases do not involve insider
trading but are informative examples of when courts have borrowed from
§ 10(b), or mail, wire, or honest services fraud found in Title 18, in
interpreting § 1348.
1.

United States v. Hussain240

Sushovan Hussain was the chief financial officer for Autonomy
Corporation plc, a British software company bought by Hewlett-Packard
(“HP”) for $11 billion in 2011.241 Within a year of the acquisition, HP alleged
that Autonomy had committed accounting fraud and had “cooked the books”
prior to the acquisition, resulting in HP writing off $8.8 billion.242 Hussain
was charged with fourteen counts of wire fraud, § 1343, one count of
conspiracy to commit wire fraud, § 1349, and one count of securities fraud,
§ 1348.243 Hussain moved to dismiss the indictment on a number of grounds,
237. Id. at 700.
238. Id. at 700–01 (“[J]ust because those facts are legally insufficient to constitute securities
fraud does not make them legally insufficient to constitute mail fraud.”).
239. See supra Part II and accompanying notes.
240. No. 16-cr-00462-CRB-1, 2017 WL 4865562, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2017).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
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including improper extraterritorial application of U.S. laws, but significant
for this Article was Hussain’s argument that the misrepresentations related to
Autonomy’s financial condition were “too remote from any purchase or sale
of HP securities to satisfy the requirement that the fraud be ‘in connection
with . . . any security.’”244
Importantly, the district court for the Northern District of California stated,
“There are few decisions interpreting this requirement. However, Hussain
and the government agree that courts should look to the securities fraud
provision of the Exchange Act in construing § 1348.”245 In doing so, the court
noted that the “in connection with” language of § 1348 is “meant to reach at
least as much conduct as the Exchange Act’s similar requirement.” 246
Next, the court turned to the legislative history of Sarbanes-Oxley in order
to assist its interpretation of § 1348247 and quoted Senator Leahy’s comment
that § 1348 was “intended to provide needed enforcement flexibility in the
context of publicly traded companies to protect shareholders and prospective
shareholders against all the types of schemes and frauds which inventive
criminals may devise in the future.”248 The court noted that § 1348 provides
“broad-textured language” to assist in prosecuting securities fraud “while
foregoing the Exchange Act’s requirement that it first specify particular
violations through rulemaking . . . . Accordingly, the Court looks to cases
decided under Exchange Act § 10(b) and the rules passed under that statute
in construing the nexus to securities required under 18 U.S.C. § 1348.” 249
The Hussain court proceeded to list the elements a plaintiff must prove in
order to recover damages under § 10(b) in a private right of action: (1)
material misrepresentation or omission by defendant; (2) scienter; (3)
connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or
sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5)
economic loss; and (6) loss causation.250 The court noted that the government
in a criminal matter does not need to prove reliance “because ‘reliance is
relevant only to the identification of the private persons entitled to bring

244. Id. at *6 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2018)).
245. Id.
246. Id. at *6–7 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78ff (2018) (noting that the Exchange Act’s
language is “in connection with the purchase or sale of securities”) (emphasis added)).
247. Id. at *7 (citing 148 CONG. REC. S7418, S7419–20 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement
of Sen. Leahy)).
248. Id. at *7.
249. Id. (citing 148 CONG. REC. S7418, S7420–21 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of
Sen. Leahy)).
250. Id. (citing Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2407 (2014)).
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suit.’”251 Likewise, the government does not need to establish loss because
there is no issue of standing in a criminal matter and because the purpose of
a criminal prosecution is deterrence rather than compensation.252 While
acknowledging that § 1348 does not require proof of willfulness, “[t]he
elements are otherwise the same in civil and criminal actions brought under
10b-5.”253
Hussain argued that he could not be liable for the misrepresentation
because he did not receive any benefit for it. 254 Hussain relied upon United
States v. Mahaffy in stating that § 1348’s nexus to a security requirement is
satisfied where “as a result of the scheme, the defendants either benefitted, or
attempted to benefit, from trading in securities.”255 The court rejected
Hussain’s argument by noting that the Mahaffy condition of a benefit is not a
necessary one, and, more specifically, applied to liability for insiders
divulging non-public information, and cited Dirks as standing for that
principle.256 As such, the Hussain court ignored the Mahaffy precedent by
stating that “this case does not allege insider trading.”257
This statement, of course, begs the question that insider trading under
§ 1348 perhaps does require proof of a benefit as outlined in Dirks. The major
takeaway from the Hussain case is that the court underwent a deep dive into
Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence in order to interpret and apply the standards for
§ 1348. The court did not take the tack that the Slawson and Melvin courts
did, which looked only at the elements of § 1348 in their plain language.
Finally, Hussain argued that § 1348 is unconstitutionally vague, a claim
that the court dismissed, but the substance of which is considered below. 258
Importantly, the Hussain court dismissed this argument by stating that the
defendant had sufficient notice of § 1348. “The government has been
prosecuting criminal securities fraud for a long time. Combined with the plain
language of § 1348, the cases decided under § 10(b) . . . sufficed to put
Hussain on notice of the government’s theory here.” 259

251. Id. (quoting United States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62, 88 (2d Cir. 2013)).
252. Id. (citing SEC v. Apuzzo, 689 F.3d 204, 212 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v. Berger,
587 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 2009)).
253. Id.
254. Id. at *8.
255. Id. (quoting United States v. Mahaffy, No. 05-CR-613, 2006 WL 2224518, at *11
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2006)).
256. Id. (citing Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983)).
257. Id.
258. See supra Part III.C.3.
259. Hussain, 2017 WL 4865562, at *9.
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United States v. Mahaffy260

The defendant in Hussain relied upon Mahaffy, and the facts and holding
of Mahaffy are informative for purposes of this Article. In Mahaffy,
defendants ran a front-running scheme, meaning that the day trading
defendants bought information from the defendant stockbrokers; the day
traders then purchased or sold securities before the institutional clients of the
stockbrokers purchased or sold large blocks of the same securities. 261
Specifically, the stockbrokers allowed the day traders to listen secretly to the
brokerage firms’ internal broadcasts concerning large orders. These
broadcasts were on internal speaker systems known as “squawk boxes.” 262
Defendants were charged with, among other things, violating § 1348, and
they moved to dismiss the indictment for failure to allege that defendants
“intended to cause an economic loss to any holder or putative holder of the
securities at issue.”263
The court began its analysis by stating that the government needed only to
prove a violation of § 1348(1), which requires proof of only three elements:
(1) fraudulent intent; (2) a scheme or artifice to defraud; and (3) a nexus with
a security.264 Regarding defendants’ argument that there was no cognizable
victim in the scheme, the court stated that the statute does “not restrict, or
even contemplate, the status of the victim.”265 Rather, it was sufficient that
the Indictment alleged that the defendants intended to defraud “any person in
connection with any security.”266 The court clarified this by stating that the
requirement that the scheme “be ‘in connection’ with a security is satisfied
where as a result of the scheme, the defendants either benefitted, or attempted
to benefit, from trading in securities.”267 Analogizing to § 1347, preventing
health care fraud, the court noted that Congress intended for the statute to
260. No. 05-CR-613, 2006 WL 2224518, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2006).
261. Id.
262. Id. at *3.
263. Id. at *12.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Hatfield, No. 06–CR–0550, 2009
WL 2182593, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2009) (“The court finds that the ‘in connection with’
language in Section 1348 does not refer solely to the purchase or sale of securities specifically
made by Defendant. Rather, Section 1348 is broad, and was not enacted to punish only the
fraudulent obtainment of money or property in connection with Defendant’s purchase or sale of
any security.”). Further, the Hatfield court stated, like § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934, “[t]here is no requirement that an individual defendant actually buy or sell securities.”
Id. (quoting United States v. Ferrarini, 9 F. Supp. 2d 284, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)).
267. Mahaffy, 2006 WL 2224518, at *12 (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642
(1997)).
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include a “wide range of conduct” as well as “not only . . . protect the holders
of securities, but to prohibit all forms of fraudulent conduct associated with
securities, regardless of who the conduct affects.”268
After addressing the “in connection with a security” element of § 1348,
the court addressed the remaining two elements, (1) whether a scheme or
artifice to defraud was properly alleged; and (2) whether the government
alleged fraudulent intent. Regarding the first element, the court directly
applied the case law related to § 1346, honest services fraud, as well as mail
fraud.269 The court analyzed United States v. Rybicki270 to analogize to both
honest services and mail fraud. “To apply Rybicki’s holding to a charge under
18 U.S.C. § 1348, it is necessary only to substitute ‘in connection with a
security’ for ‘use the mails or wire to.’”271 The court in Mahaffy then made
clear that the fraud must include a “material misrepresentation or omission”
under a broader standard than “reasonably foreseeable harm” but that neither
standard “requires an actual economic loss nor an intent to economically
harm.”272 Rather, “[t]he materiality test only requires that the
misrepresentation or omission ‘would naturally tend to lead or is capable of
leading a reasonable employer to change its conduct.’” 273 This language
makes sense in the context of honest services fraud but is more opaque in
relation to securities fraud. The court attempted to clarify its rule by stating
“[p]otential harm is the only prerequisite” given that economic harm is not
required to prove the existence of a scheme or artifice to defraud. 274 The court
held, therefore, that because the brokerage firms’ reputations would be
damaged by the front-running scheme, the firms could face economic harm;
thus, the element of “scheme or artifice to defraud” was met. 275
Further, the court turned to the principle set forth in Carpenter that
misappropriation of confidential business information, even without proof of
monetary loss to victims, “can be sufficient to support mail and wire fraud—
and by extension, securities fraud—convictions.”276 The court also relied
268. Id. (citing United States v. Lucien, 347 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2003) (analyzing § 1347 and
the breadth of the heath care fraud statute’s definition of victim)).
269. Id. at *12–16 (noting that although the indictment did not allege a deprivation of the
intangible right of honest services, “it need not for the Court to apply § 1346, because this section
only provides a legal definition of criminal activity already encompassed and charged by the
language tracking § 1348”).
270. 354 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2003).
271. Mahaffy, 2006 WL 2224518, at *13.
272. Id. (citing United States v. Vinyard, 266 F.3d 320, 327–29 (4th Cir. 2001)).
273. Id. (citing Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 145).
274. Id. (citing United States v. Coffey, 361 F. Supp. 2d 102, 118 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)).
275. Id. at *14–15.
276. Id. at *14.
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upon the fact that the brokers had failed to tell their firms that they were
selling the information, which represented a breach of duty, thereby
defrauding the firms and the firms’ institutional clients of honest services. 277
The court also carried over the application of § 1346 honest services fraud
into its assessment of fraudulent intent. The court noted that the rule requires
intent to deceive and intent to cause harm but also states that “fraudulent
intent may be inferred from the scheme itself” when the result of the scheme
is to injure others.278 In the next sentence, the court stated with somewhat
circular reasoning that when the scheme results in the deprivation of honest
services (despite not being charged in Mahaffy), “[t]he only intent that need
be proven . . . is the intent to deprive another of the intangible right of honest
services.”279
Importantly, the Mahaffy court also addressed defendant’s argument about
the rule of lenity in the application of § 1348. 280 Specifically, defendants
alleged that the government was predicating criminal liability on alleged
conduct that was “at best . . . on the far edges of the securities laws’ scope.” 281
In response, the court stated that the front-running scheme “might well have
been charged either as a more general mail and wire fraud or a more specific
10-b(5) [sic] securities fraud.”282 The court acknowledged that it analyzed
§ 1348 “by analogy to similar crimes and similar statutes.”283 Because the
fraud in Mahaffy was not tipper-tippee insider trading, the ultimate question
is whether the same analogies and standards for that crime under § 10(b)
should be imported for § 1348.
3.

SEC v. Stein284

Unlike Hussain and Mahaffy, SEC v. Stein was not a criminal case.
Nevertheless, this case is important because it stands for the principle that the
defendant’s criminal conviction under § 1348 allowed for summary judgment
in the related civil case. In Stein, the defendant appealed a district court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of the SEC. The SEC claimed the
277. Id. at *15. Again, the court substitutes honest services fraud as the standard for proving
the existence of a fraud, and ostensibly (because it does not state this explicitly) relies upon the
“in connection with a security” to apply that same standard to § 1348.
278. Id. at *16 (citing United States v. D’Amato, 39 F.3d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir. 1994)).
279. Id. (citing Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 145).
280. Id. at *18; see also infra Part IV.C (regarding analysis of the rule of lenity).
281. Mahaffy, 2006 WL 2224518, at *18.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. 906 F.3d 823, 834 (9th Cir. 2018).
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defendant violated various securities laws and argued in its motion for
summary judgment that the related criminal conviction against Stein for the
same conduct precluded him from contesting the allegations at issue in the
civil case.285
Stein was not an insider trading case. Defendant Michael Stein was an
attorney who acted as purported outside counsel to Heart Tronics. Stein and
the company engaged in a series of frauds involving false purchase orders
with fictitious companies.286 The frauds were designed to inflate Heart
Tronic’s stock price.287 Concurrent with the SEC’s case against Stein, the
DOJ filed a criminal case against him for the same activity, charging him
with three counts of securities fraud under § 1348, three counts of wire fraud,
three counts of mail fraud, one count of conspiracy to commit mail and wire
fraud, three counts of money laundering, and one count of conspiracy to
obstruction of justice.288 The DOJ then intervened in the SEC action to stay
discovery pending the outcome of the criminal matter.289 Stein was convicted
by a jury on all counts. 290
Following his conviction, the SEC moved for summary judgment, arguing
that the “criminal conviction ‘necessarily decided’ the facts needed to
establish [Stein’s] liability in the related civil case.” 291 The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the SEC. Stein appealed. 292 The Ninth
Circuit considered whether the SEC could avail itself of the doctrine of
“‘offensive nonmutual issue preclusion,’ which prevents ‘a defendant from
relitigating the issues which a defendant previously litigated and lost against
another plaintiff.’”293
The court reiterated that in order to claim that a prior criminal conviction
should act as the basis for offensive preclusion, the following elements must
be present:
(1) the prior conviction was for a serious offense; (2) the issue at
stake in the civil proceeding is identical to the issue raised in the
prior criminal proceeding; (3) there was a full and fair opportunity
to litigate the issue at the prior trial; and (4) the issue on which the
285. Id. at 826.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 827.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 828.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. (citing Syverson v. IBM Corp., 472 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal
citations omitted)).
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prior conviction is offered was actually litigated and necessarily
decided at trial.294

As the court outlined, there are typically four factors to consider when
deciding if the issues are identical for purposes of issue preclusion: (1)
whether there is “substantial overlap between the evidence or argument to be
advanced in the second proceeding and that advanced in the first”; (2)
whether “the new evidence or argument involve[s] the application of the
same rule of law as that involved in the prior proceeding”; (3) whether
“pretrial preparation and discovery related to the matter presented in the first
action reasonably can be expected to have embraced the matter sought to be
presented in the second”; and (4) whether “the claims involved in the two
proceedings” are closely related. 295
With these rubrics in mind, the court determined that the same fraudulent
scheme underpinned Stein’s criminal conviction and the § 10(b) claims
brought by the SEC. In other words, the court concluded that “Stein’s
conviction determined the identical issues the SEC was required to prove to
establish Stein’s liability for securities fraud.” 296 More importantly for
purposes of this Article, the court went on to state that “the SEC’s securities
fraud claims involve the ‘application of the same rule of law’ as that involved
in the criminal case.”297
The court noted under § 1348 that the jury was required to find “(1) a
scheme or artifice to defraud, (2) with fraudulent intent, (3) in connection
with any security.”298 The court therefore held that “the DOJ proved beyond
a reasonable doubt the same issues the SEC needed to prove only by a
preponderance of the evidence. There is no difference in the applicable legal
standards that would affect the outcome of the civil case.” 299
Although the Stein case did not involve insider trading, it represents an
important issue that could apply to insider trading § 10(b) cases. That is, if a
defendant is found guilty for insider trading under § 1348, the SEC could
move for summary judgment on § 10(b) insider trading claims under the same
reasoning as was applied in Stein, thereby effectively doing an entire end294. Id. (citing Ayers v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 1990)).
295. Id. at 828–29 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. c (AM. LAW
INST. 1982)). “The assessment of the similarity of issues necessary to decide whether collateral
estoppel should preclude relitigation of a particular issue varies with the facts of each case.” JACK
H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.10 (5th ed.
2015).
296. Stein, 906 F.3d at 830.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. Interestingly, the court was referring to the elements required under § 17(a) as closely
related enough to those of § 1348.
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around of the Dirks personal benefit test and its progeny. The following Part
addresses this problematic collateral consequence of charging insider trading
under § 1348.
IV.

RAMIFICATIONS OF A NEW INSIDER TRADING STATUTE

Is § 1348 a sufficient fix to solving the issues surrounding insider trading?
Do the headaches caused by the judicial interpretation of Rule 10b-5 dissipate
if insider trading is charged only under § 1348 going forward? If not, how
shall we go about solving the thorny issues surrounding insider trading? For
starters, we need clarification on what the crime is and who the victim is.
These two questions are inherently interrelated. If the crime is market
unfairness, and the crime is one of fraud perpetrated on the market as a victim,
then that would shape the prosecutorial strategy. If the crime is the theft of
corporate information as a property right, and the victim therefore is the
company, then that dictates, perhaps, a different prosecutorial approach. 300
These options, however, are not mutually exclusive. Both crimes could occur
with both types of victims. The fact that all of these facets are lumped together
under one nebulous, largely judicially created prohibition on insider trading
is the reason that there is no quick fix. Given that the aforementioned
questions attempt to tackle immense theoretical issues, it is worth looking at
the issues specific to § 1348 that arise in the cases mentioned above. This Part
addresses some of the ramifications of charging § 1348 in lieu of § 10(b).
Finally, this Part looks at the rule of lenity, given the innumerous questions
surrounding the crime of insider trading and the application of the laws
prohibiting it, and suggests that the rule of lenity should apply to insider
trading charges under § 1348.
A. Inversion of Criminal and Civil Burdens of Proof for Insider
Trading
One issue with avoiding criminal insider trading charges under § 10(b)
and instead opting to charge § 1348 is that the elements for § 1348 are less
burdensome than for those of § 10(b). Because § 10(b) can be the basis of a
civil suit brought by the SEC, the practical consequence of this burden
300. Indeed, this was the issue upon which Judge Kearse dissented in Blaszczak. United
States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19, 45–49 (2d Cir. 2019) (Kearse, J., dissenting). Judge Kearse was
not convinced that the CMS information constituted property or a thing of value, nor that the
government agency could be considered a victim of theft based on the facts. Id. at 47.
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inversion is that it is much easier to convict for criminal securities fraud than
it is for civil insider trading, despite both charges being brought from the
same set of facts. This is precisely the outcome from Blaszczak.301 The court
affirmed the jury’s determination that the defendants were guilty of violating
§ 1348 but not guilty on the § 10(b) claims because the jury did not find that
the government had proven the existence of a personal benefit, as is required
under § 10(b).302
This inversion of civil and criminal standards seemingly implicates
foundational concepts of law.303 Insider trading under § 10(b) is somewhat
unique in that it can be brought under either a civil or criminal standard, but
the test remains the same. This means that a civil action brought by the SEC
under § 10(b) will be harder to prove, despite the lower burden of proof, than
the criminal action brought under § 1348 for the same alleged activity. This
seemingly distorts the purpose of criminal law 304 and hamstrings the SEC as
an agency that likely would not be able to bring many successful civil actions
on insider trading, despite being tasked by Congress to maintain fairness of
the securities markets.305 William Stuntz’s article on this point makes clear
that there is inherent risk when legislators decide what is and what is not a
crime, and then which procedures to apply. 306 He argues that there is
significant risk for overcriminalization of activities when the legislature
designates authority to prosecutors. Insider trading seems ripe for this type of
criticism, given that the codified law itself is silent as to the activity, and one
is left to wade through decades of common law under only § 10(b) to
ascertain the parameters of the prohibited activity. 307

301. See supra Part II.A and accompanying notes.
302. Id.
303. See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, Culpability and Modern Crime, 103 GEO. L.J. 547, 548
(2015) (outlining the purposes of criminal law and recognizing the need for courts to assess
whether defendants were aware of normative wrongfulness or were merely negligent).
304. See generally William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 38–40 (1996).
305. This fact should not be understated. Insider trading affects markets and market fairness.
To shift prosecution of insider trading to criminal enforcement bodies only could shift the role
and purpose of the SEC. See, e.g., Karen E. Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC’s
New Role as Diplomatic and Humanitarian Watchdog, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315, 1320–22
(2012) (describing the tripartite role of the SEC as authorized by Congress in the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act).
306. Stuntz, supra note 304, at 1.
307. Id. at 16–18.
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B. Imputation of Liability in Civil Summary Judgment
A related issue to the inverted burdens of proof is the imputation of
liability simply because of a criminal conviction. This is what happened in
SEC v. Stein, discussed above.308 In that case, the SEC was able to piggyback
on the criminal conviction for securities fraud, albeit not for insider trading.
As a result, the SEC moved for summary judgment based upon the criminal
conviction arising from the same set of facts. If applied to § 10(b) insider
trading cases, a conviction under § 1348 could serve as the basis for civil
liability for insider trading without ever mentioning the Dirks test or the other
fifty years of jurisprudence stemming from § 10(b).309
The writings of William Stuntz are informative on this point, as well. 310
When an overcriminalized activity has collateral effects in the civil realm, it
seems that the function of the law is diluted if not entirely lost. The fact that
the SEC can take up the mantle of additional civil prosecution on the heels of
a criminal prosecution strikes one as a classic case of double jeopardy; yet,
as was the case in United States v. Ying,311 detailed above, there is no claim
for double jeopardy when one of the matters at issue is a civil claim. That is,
double jeopardy only attaches to a subsequent criminal action. Though this is
certainly the black letter law, it is worthy of a harder look when seen through
the lens of insider trading and the nebulous parameters for the prohibited
activity.
The example of the Stein case suggests that insider trading precedent under
§ 10(b) is effectively a dead letter. The SEC will allow the DOJ to pursue the
easier outcome of criminal liability under § 1348, and then take advantage of
imputing the criminal conviction as proof for the civil action without ever
addressing the elements of § 10(b) liability established by the courts for the
past five decades.
C. Rule of Lenity
The risk of an inverted standard for civil and criminal actions based on the
same nucleus of facts suggests that a closer look should be given to § 1348,
and one that may involve the statutory construction canons. 312 As noted
308. See supra Part III.C and accompanying notes.
309. Indeed, the interplay and overlap between the SEC and DOJ on related matters can be
problematic, particularly in insider trading cases and others.
310. Stuntz, supra note 304, at 38–40.
311. See supra Part III.A and accompanying notes.
312. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ
STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 407–45 (2016); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER,
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above, the defendants in Mahaffy raised the issue of the rule of lenity.313
Although Mahaffy was not a classic insider trading case but instead a case
involving a front-running scheme, the argument that insider trading law, and
the application of § 1348 in particular, is not clear and therefore should be
afforded the rule of lenity is meritorious.314
The rule of lenity is “almost as old as the common law itself”315 and
instructs judges to construe ambiguous criminal statutes narrowly and in
favor of the defendant.316 In practicality, this means that when a criminal law
is open to interpretation by the judiciary, a court must select the “less severe
interpretation, absent clear and definite language by Congress.” 317
The rule of lenity is analogous to Chevron deference afforded to agencies’
interpretations.318 Chevron deference and its interplay with the rule of lenity
is particularly apt when considering insider trading, given that insider trading
can be prosecuted in the civil and criminal arenas, with the SEC as
administrative agency bringing civil actions. In other words, the SEC’s
interpretation and use of insider trading prohibitions would be afforded
Chevron deference; likewise, the DOJ’s criminal actions for insider trading
READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 296–302 (2012); Cass R. Sunstein, Law
and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2106–07 (1990).
313. United States v. Mahaffy, No. 05-CR-613, 2006 WL 2224518, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. Aug.
2, 2006); supra Part III.C and accompanying notes.
314. The Mahaffy court dismissed the defendants’ arguments about the rule of lenity applied
to § 1348 by stating that
[t]he fact that a relatively new statute has been enacted to broadly address a
particular subset of [mail, wire and securities] fraud—those which are
conducted in connection with securities––does not provide a basis for
concluding that the dishonesty and unlawfulness of such a scheme had been
previously unknown in the minds of men.
Mahaffy, 2006 WL 2224518, at *18. The court therefore held that the rule of lenity and due
process concerns had no application because “construing [§ 1348] by analogy to similar crimes
and similar statutes provides ample demonstration that this statute is far from ambiguous.” Id.
Notably, the Second Circuit in Blaszczak cited Mahaffy as an example of the difference between
the purposes of Title 15 and Title 18. United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19, 35 (2d Cir. 2019).
315. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 29 (Amy Gutmann ed. 1997).
316. Intisar A. Rabb, The Appellate Rule of Lenity, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 179, 180 (2018)
https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Vol131_Rabb.pdf [https://perma.cc/
YFX4-PQFQ] (responding to Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on
the Bench: A Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Court of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV.
1298 (2018)); Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2420, 2421 (2006).
317. Liza B. Fleming, Lenity Calling: A Plea To End Chevron Deference for Criminal Insider
Trading Law, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 579, 591–92 (2017); see also Anna Currier, The Rule of Lenity
and the Enforcement of Federal Securities Laws, 5 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 79, 96–98 (2015).
318. See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–
44 (1984); Rabb, supra note 316, at 183.
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could require application of the rule of lenity. Chevron review involves a twostep process.319 In the first step, the court must assess whether the meaning of
the statute at issue is ambiguous or susceptible to multiple interpretations. 320
If the court answers that first inquiry in the affirmative, it then must determine
whether the agency interpretation of the statute is reasonable. 321 Chevron
deference requires courts to accept the agency interpretation if it is deemed
reasonable. Similarly, the lenity framework requires a determination as to
whether a challenged criminal statute (or a civil statute with criminal
consequences, as is the case for § 10(b)) is open to multiple plausible
interpretations.322 If multiple interpretations exist, and statutory construction
yields more than one plausible reading, “lenity would apply to require
selection of the narrowest such reading.” 323
When considering both Chevron deference and the rule of lenity as
applying to civil or criminal insider trading under § 10(b), it seems both
rubrics would be appropriate given the general ambiguity in recent case law
surrounding the parameters of insider trading, particularly in cases involving
remote tipper-tippees.324 However, it is arguably even more appropriate for
the rule of lenity to apply for tipper-tippee insider trading charges under
319. See Matthew Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L.
REV. 597, 598–600 (2009) (conflating the Chevron review process into a more streamlined, onestep analysis); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 247–49 (2006) (debating
how courts decide to apply any Chevron test in the first instance); Matthew C. Turk & Karen E.
Woody, Justice Kavanaugh, Lorenzo v. SEC, and the Post-Kennedy Supreme Court, 71 ADMIN.
L. REV. 193, 246–49 (2019) (analyzing the potential demise of Chevron deference based on the
new makeup of the Supreme Court).
320. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 842–43.
321. Id. at 844.
322. See Rabb, supra note 316, at 189 (citing Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 547–48
(2015) (“[I]f our recourse to traditional tools of statutory construction leaves any doubt about the
meaning of the [challenged term], . . . we would invoke the rule that ‘ambiguity concerning the
ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.’”) (alteration in original) (internal
citations omitted)).
323. Id. (citing United States v. Thompson/Ctr. Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 517–18 (1992)).
Professor Rabb describes two alternative weights for each of the steps of the lenity framework.
In one, which he deems “lenity first,” courts should consider the lenity framework relevant for all
criminal statutes ab initio. Rabb describes this approach as common on the Supreme Court until
recently, when a stricter approach became dominant. The second approach, deemed “lenity last,”
involves courts taking a very broad approach to the first step of the framework and questioning
all of the plausible interpretations of a statute through “their preferred methods of statutory
construction.” Id. at 190. If there is any plausible or fair reading of the statute, or a purpose of the
statute that can be “gleaned from the overall policy or legislative history,” then courts do not need
to resort to lenity. Id. Rabb considers this a “junior version of the vagueness doctrine”––with
“neither doctrine [vagueness or lenity] applying unless there is no fair or consistent application
of the challenged provision over time.” Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
324. See supra Part I and accompanying notes.
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18 U.S.C. § 1348 given the scant jurisprudential treatment of insider trading
under that statute, and the potential for serious punishment associated with
the criminal charge under § 1348.
Liza Fleming addresses this concept by pointing out certain ways in which
insider trading is unique among “administrative crimes.” 325 Fleming
underscores that insider trading is considered a malum prohibitum crime,
meaning only prohibited by statute or regulation, and, in the case of tippertippees, only prohibited based upon the relationship between tipper-tippee if
no personal benefit exists.326 Drawing on the work of Professor Dan Kahan,
Fleming argues that lenity is appropriate for § 10(b) insider trading cases,
rather than blind deference to the SEC and its administrative agenda. 327 Lenity
is even more appropriate in the cases where insider trading is charged under
§ 1348 as a stand-alone criminal statute with increased penalties and
consequences.
CONCLUSION
This Article has provided the backdrop to insider trading and the everchanging elements for proving the civil and criminal elements of insider
trading under § 10(b). However, this Article has posited that the elements of
insider trading under § 10(b) may soon be wholly irrelevant for criminal
prosecution given the flexibility and “blank slate” afforded by charging
insider trading under § 1348. The recent case at the Second Circuit, United
States v. Blaszczak teed up the myriad issues with proceeding under this new
regime. Although mail and wire fraud charges have always been in the
government’s arsenal for any fraud-based claim, the fact that insider trading
is a malum prohibitum claim, and one that is only illegal in a tipper-tippee
situation if there is a personal benefit conferred, it seems that an entirely new
construct for insider trading may arise under § 1348 prosecutions. The result
will be an inversion of civil and criminal standards as related to insider
trading. The ever-moving target of defining the crime itself suggests that the
rule of lenity is appropriate until Congress acts, or some other definitive lines
for insider trading are drawn.

325. See Fleming, supra note 317, at 599–605; see also Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant
to Federal Criminal Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 485 (1996).
326. Fleming, supra note 317, at 599–605.
327. Id. at 595.

